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Abstract
Given the continuous advancements in the technology of energy harvesting over
the last few years, we are now starting to see wireless sensor networks (WSNs)
powered by scavenged energy. This change in paradigm has major repercussions
not only on the hardware engineering aspects, but also on the software side. The
first protocols specifically designed to take advantage of the energy harvesting ca-
pabilities of a network have just recently appeared. At the same time, security re-
mains one of the central points of WSNs development, because of their intrin-
sically unreliable nature that combines a readily accessible communication infras-
tructure such as wireless data exchange, to an often likewise readily accessible phys-
ical deployment. This dissertation provides a comprehensive look at how security
can be improved by what energy harvesting has to offer. The main question asked
is whether or not it is possible to provide better security in a WSN, by being aware
of the fact that the amount of available energy is not going to monotonically de-
crease over time. The work covers different aspects and components of a WSN and
focuses on what is arguably one the most important ones, medium access control
(MAC) protocols. An energy-harvesting specific MAC protocol is introduced to-
gether with a related security suite. A new attack relevant to a whole class of MAC
protocols is also introduced, along with a scheme that defeats it. A security ap-
proach for MAC protocols is discussed to provide an energy-aware solution. In
iii
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order to address security bootstrapping, a new energy-adaptive key reinforcement
scheme is presented. Finally an implementation and some experimental results are
provided.
iv
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Resumé
De seneste års fortsatte teknologiske fremskridt inden for energi-høst (energy harvesting)
har ført til fremkomsten af trådløse sensor netværk (WSN) baseret på udnyttelse af
indhøstet energi. Dette paradigmeskift har omfattende konsekvenser ikke alene for
udvikling af hardware, men også for udvikling af software. For nyligt er fremkommet
de første protokoller til netværk specielt udviklede med henblik på at udnytte energihøst.
Et WSN, der kombinerer en let tilgængelig kommunikationsinfrastruktur, eksempelvis
trådløs dataoverførsel, med en let tilgængelig fysisk implementering, er som udgangspunkt
ikke pålideligt, hvorfor sikkerhed forbliver et centralt spørgsmål i udvikling af WSN.
Denne afhandling giver en grundig analyse af, hvordan sikkerhed kan forbedres i
et netværk baseret på energi-høst.
Et centralt spørgsmål er, hvorvidt der kan opnås en bedre sikkerhed i et WSN
ved at erkende det forhold, at mængden af  tilgængelig energi ikke er monotont
faldende over tid. Arbejdet behandler forskellige aspekter af og komponenter benyttet
i et WSN med fokus på MAC (medium access control) protokoller. En MAC protokol
udviklet med henblik på energi-høst introduceres med tilhørende sikkerhedspakke.
Et nyt angreb relevant for en klasse af MAC protokoller indføres, og en metode til
bekæmpelse af sådanne angreb beskrives. En sikkerheds-adaptiv metodik diskuteres
for MAC protokoller med henblik på at levere energibevidst sikkerhed, og en ny
energi-adaptiv nøglebaseret metode for sikkerhed bliver foreslået. Endelig præsenteres
v
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en implementering og eksperimentelle resultater.
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1
Introduction
Over the last years and thanks to the improvements of technology, comput-ers and embedded devices have become more and more ubiquitous. It is
nowadays normal and almost expected for everything that we use in our everyday
life to have some kind of intelligence. From our computers, to our phones and
tablets, everything that surrounds us is interactive and very often interconnected.
The miniaturization process has drastically increased the possibility of fitting
such smart devices into more and more items. Smart houses, smart cars and smart
systems in general make our lives easier and leave us always in control of the swarm
of devices that we own or that we find scattered throughout the places that we visit
every day. We are often able to control all such devices at once, independent of
what our physical location is, thanks to them being all networked and remotely
accessible.
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are a collection of small embedded systems
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1. INTRODUCTION
that can communicate one another to perform many different tasks. They per-
fectly fit in this description of ubiquitous systems and are becoming more and
more widespread. They are deployed to solve many problems and their applica-
tions are disparate. Used to effortlessly monitor extensive areas in an unmanned
fashion, finding their ways in military applications, or granting remote safe access
to hazardous locations, WSNs are a formidable way to address many challenges.
Scientific research on this topic has been going on almost since the dawn of
computers. It is however with the transition to the digital world we now live in,
that we can really start to take full advantage from this technology. It is now pos-
sible to make our abode more comfortable by making sure that the habitat that we
will find therein will be precisely matching our requirements, even if we have been
absent for a long period of time. Or again, our car will constantly monitor itself
thanks to the large number of sensors disseminated throughout the whole vehicle,
and aptly inform us of any malfunction, all while we are comfortably sitting behind
the wheel.
Historically speaking, power has always been a major concern for WSNs which
had to be serviced and kept operational after the initial deployment, something
that usually required human intervention. Thanks to the all-new introduction of
energy-harvesting wireless sensor networks (EH-WSNs), this factor has been greatly
mitigated by allowing individual nodes to recharge themselves through solar pan-
els, wind turbines or similar technologies. While far away from being a magic wand
that solves all the problems, the recent addition of energy harvesting (EH) has dra-
matically improved the lifespan of a sensor network, making modern devices far
more reliable. New applications have also been made possible, up to the extent
where miniaturized nodes have be implanted into the body of a person to monitor
the sugar level of his or her blood, while exploiting the oxidation of the very same
sugars to power themselves.
Thanks to EH, the general paradigm of achieving the longest possible lifespanwhile
still producing a good enough result has shifted in favor of producing the best possible
result with the amount of energy currently available. The fact that energy will become
available once again in the near future allows a node to undertake energy intensive
2
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tasks and tap into its reserve, knowing that it will soon be replenished.
Finally, given the increase in usability, number of functionalities, and the stricter
and stricter dependability requirements, security for WSNs is a major concern.
Given the degree of trust that we put into these systems, making sure that the infor-
mation that a node carries should not be made available to external unauthorized
entities, or that these same information and parameters can be modified only by
those that have the right authority to do so, is paramount. These and many others
are the goals of computer security, something that should be factored in the design
of every good application, right from the beginning.
1.1 DissertationOverview
Given the incredible impact that the addition of EH has had on the applications
relying on WSNs, we set out to understand whether or not the same kind of impact
can be had on the security aspect. Is it possible to take advantage of the EH capa-
bilities of a node to provide better, more reliable and more efficient security? This
and other similar questions constitute the main focus of this dissertation, which
tries to give these problems an answer.
The reminder of this manuscript is organized as depicted in Figure 1.1 and as
discussed here. In Chapter 2 we give an introduction to WSNs, explain in greater
details how they work by analyzing each one of their components individually. We
will explore what different types of WSN do exist, what are their main character-
istics, advantages and disadvantages. We will also talk about the main challenges
and design goals of sensor networks. Additionally, in this chapter we will introduce
EH-WSNs, take a closer look at how they solve many problems posed by regular
WSNs but also how they introduce a whole new set of challenges.
Chapter 3 follows naturally from the previous one. Here we present an intro-
duction to security in the context of WSNs, we discuss what we mean by the term
secure system and talk about the need of a comprehensive classification of attackers.
To this purpose we introduce a new and extended taxonomy of attackers that takes
into account the specific challenges of EH-WSNs. We then apply our taxonomy
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Figure 1.1: Organization and logical connections.
to standard well-known security attacks that can be mounted in a sensor network,
and compile a list of attackers describing the capabilities required to perform them.
We then introduce one of the main topics of our work which is security in the data
link layer. We describe it at a deeper level by introducing different types of medium
access control (MAC) protocols and then presenting its state of the art and some
previous work.
Chapter 4 focuses even more on the data link layer, and MAC protocols. Here
we present on-demand medium access control (ODMAC), a new receiver-initiated
(RI) protocol specifically designed for EH-WSN. We then discuss its security and
4
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how it can be improved. To that extent we introduce a security suite designed for
and incorporated into ODMAC. We finish this chapter by introducing an all-new
attack, the beacon replay attack.
Chapter 5 continues right where the previous chapter leaves. Here we in for-
mally describe and introduce the beacon replay attack first introduced in Chap-
ter 3, a new attack specific to ODMAC and to the whole class of RI protocols in
general. We discuss why this attack is significant, what can be achieved from it and
why classic solution for similar attacks do not work. We then present the receiver
authentication protocol (RAP), an adaptive protocol that can be used to defeat the
beacon replay attack and, at the same time, be configured in many different ways,
to suit both regular and EH sensor networks. We finally present a security proof
of our protocol and analyze its performance in terms of energy consumption.
In Chapter 6 we shift our attention to adaptive security and take advantage of
the concept introduced in Chapters 3 and 4. Here we discuss how the constantly
changing energy levels of an EH-WSN can be leveraged from a security standpoint.
We look at how different schemes and parameters can be used according to the
current energy status of the whole network but also on a link-to-link level. We dis-
cuss some different modes and configurations that can be used to achieve different
results and provide a discussion about how the scheme can be freely adjusted to
match the constraints posed by the applications and how we believe this should be
the main driving factor in general. We finish the chapter by discussing the sound-
ness of the scheme.
In Chapter 7 we introduce the topic of key management. This complements
the discussion points presented in Chapters 3 to 5 as a fundamental component
for securely using encryption. Here we present an introduction to some canonical
approaches for distributing and managing cryptographic keys in a sensor network.
We then present a specific scheme by the name of multipath key reinforcement in
greater detail. We discuss how it can provide better security but how it is not a good
match for EH-WSNs. We then present a new version of this scheme that addresses
the problem and takes full advantage of the different energy levels of an EH-WSN
by means of an adaptive approach. We conclude the chapter by describing some
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experimental work and the related results.
Chapter 8 contains our practical implementation work. In this chapter we de-
scribe the hardware platform used and talk about the capabilities of each compo-
nent. We then present and discuss the implementation of ODMAC and how this
has been realized. We continue by presenting and justifying the main experiments
that we have been running on our platform, and discuss some analytical results.
Finally Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation providing an overview of our find-
ings, discussing some future work and presenting some final remarks.
1.2 Main Contribution
The following list contains the main contribution presented in this dissertation.
Attack Taxonomy andCyber Physical Attacker We present an attack taxonomy
to take into account new aspects of security introduced by EH. We apply
this taxonomy to common attacks and argue for the need of a new attacker
model that is specific to sensor network.
Security suite for ODMAC We discuss and introduce ODMAC and expose its
lack of security. We then design and introduce a specifically tailored security
suite that can provide authentication and confidentiality.
RAP We define the beacon replay attack, a new attack relevant to the entire class
of RI MAC protocols. We then introduce a new protocol that defeats this
attack. We test the protocol both formally and analytically.
Adaptive security scheme forMACprotocols and EH-WSNs We present the
foundations for a new scheme that allows to achieve different security lev-
els and security properties within the network, depending on the amount
of energy currently available.
Keymanagement We introduce a new extended key reinforcement scheme to be
used with EH-WSNs. We follow two approaches, one static and one fully
dynamic and present the connected results.
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Implementation We present some implementation work connected to ODMAC
and its security suite.
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It’s that simple. Wireless is wireless, and it’s digital. Hopefully
somewhere along the line somebody will add more ones to the
zeros. When digital first started, I swear I could hear the gap
between the ones and the zeros.
Eddie Van Halen
2
Wireless Sensor Networks
The main focus of this work are wireless sensor networks (WSNs) so it is ap-propriate to begin the dissertation by introducing what a WSN is. We will
present the most relevant aspects, but for more detail and additional information
the reader is referred to [1, 87].
2.1 Introduction toWSNs
WSNs are collections of small and inexpensive embedded devices, normally re-
ferred to as sensor nodes or just nodes. These nodes are interconnected through a
computer network which relies on radio communications, thus making it a wire-
less network. Typically nodes are scattered throughout a geographic area that is
known as the sensed area. Such an area can span from the body of a person up to
entire fields and forests.
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In its simplest incarnation (Figure 2.1) a WSN has two main types of compo-
nents: several sensor nodes and one special node called sink or base station (BS).
Let us analyze them both.
Sink Node
Sensor Node
Communication Line
Figure 2.1: A typical wireless sensor network.
2.1.1 Anatomy of a Node
Nodes are the core building blocks of WSNs and are equipped with a few funda-
mental components as shown in Figure 2.2.
First of all a power supply unit (PSU) is required to enable the whole apparatus
to work, this is typically a battery of some form and the related regulating circuitry,
but as we will see later on, notable exceptions to this concept do exist.
A second crucial component is a processing unit, which provides the nodes with
some kind of computational power. Typically microcontroller units (MCUs) are
used for this purpose, but microprocessor units (MPUs) can be found as well. In-
dependent of the actual technology in use, this component is the brain of the sys-
10
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Transceiver
Antenna
MCU/MPU
EEPROM
A/D Converter
Raw DataPacketizedData
Sensor(s)
Power Supply
Figure 2.2: The main components of a sensor node.
tem and gives nodes the capability of being programmed and thus perform non-
trivial tasks on the data at their disposal, rather than myopically relaying informa-
tion.
A third important component is memory, this is needed for each node to store
programs and data. Depending on the specific processing unit used, this compo-
nent might be stand-alone or built-in.
In order to fulfill their role as data generators, nodes must be equipped with
one or more sensors. These are almost always integrated circuits (ICs) that allow
to transform a physical quantity such as temperature, humidity, radioactivity or
light intensity, to name a few, into an electric voltage or current that in turns can be
converted by means of an analog to digital converter (ADC) into a digital value,
understandable by the processor and ready to be elaborated or transmitted. Again,
depending on the specific technology used for the sensors, the ADC might be a
separated unit or it might be built inside the IC package.
Besides generating data, nodes also have a second role, that is acting as a net-
work relay. In order to fulfill this a radio frequency (RF) transceiver is necessary.
This component, with the help of an external antenna, provides a node with wire-
less connectivity allowing it to communicate with other nodes by using predefined
11
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schemes or protocols.
A typical modern and mass produced sensor node can be seen in Figure 2.3.
2
1
34
Figure 2.3: A typical, mass produced, sensor node (ez430 [40]) with its main
components: the MCU containing the integrated memory, the ADC and a
temperature sensor (1), the transceiver (2), the on-board antenna (3) and the
power supply connector (4).
Sensor networks can survive and operate correctly only if enough nodes are
active, in order to do so duty-cycles (DCs) must be introduced. Given that the
amount of energy available to each node is a fixed an constantly decreasing quan-
tity, it is highly inefficient to keep every node of the network switched on without
any reason. Similarly, performing too many operations such as reading from the
sensor too often, can also quickly deplete the battery. The technique used to ex-
tend the life of a node is known as duty-cycling. DC is a term borrowed from elec-
tronics engineering and defines the percentage of a period where a periodic signal
is active.
Assuming that nodes perform tasks in a cyclic fashion, in the world of WSNs
the DC is defined as the amount of time that the node spends being active over the
length of its period. When a node is not in its active state, it is effectively turned
off or asleep. Modern MCUs are equipped with several low-power modes (LPMs)
modes where different peripherals are powered down. By selecting one of these
LPMs modes, the node can maintain active just its essential components, keeping
ready to be awakened when a specific event is fired. Duty-cycling is a standard but
fundamental technique that is used in virtually every sensor network.
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2.1.2 Sink Nodes and Base Stations
The other important entity that can be found within a WSN is the so called sink.
This is a special node that greatly differs from regular sensor nodes, both from a
physical and a logical point of view. The sink node, also referred to as BS is a much
more powerful and capable component of the system, usually a laptop class entity.
Hence it can perform much more complex tasks for extended periods of time.
Normally the role of a sink is to be the final recipient for all the data packets
generated within the network, collecting them and functioning as an interface to-
ward the end users which can be either human or other hosts on a different kind of
network. Anyway this is a general scheme and may vary according to the specific
network topology and organization.
2.1.3 Design Goals
There are several design goals in WSNs and they encompass many different as-
pects. First and foremost a sensor node should be inexpensive. It is not uncom-
mon for a network to have hundreds of nodes which are considered disposable
assets. Very rarely individual nodes are serviced or even replaced after a failure.
This would not be possible if a single unit was expensive to produce.
Secondly a node should be small in size. The reason for this are multiple: smaller
nodes are cheaper to mass manufacture and usually have a lower power consump-
tion. Sometimes this is also dictated by the application itself. If a sensor node has
to be injected into the bloodstream of a patient it must necessarily be small enough
not to obstruct the veins.
Another very critical quality is low energy consumption. As we will discuss later,
energy plays a big role in WSNs. Nevertheless, it is intuitive to understand that the
lower the energy consumption, the longer a whole network can survive.
More important qualities are adaptability and self-configurability. Sensor net-
works are highly dynamic systems where the neighborhood of a node is constantly
changing due to the fact that single nodes might be able to physically move through-
out the network or that they are expected to fail over time. This means that a robust
13
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design which allows complete independence is key. Nodes should react and adapt
when new peers join or part the network, they should be able to self-configure,
forming the predefined topology in a completely distributed manner, without hav-
ing to rely on external help during deployment phase.
Reliability and fault tolerance are other important qualities. RF links are sus-
ceptible to errors and interference, while nodes could suddenly fail. Well designed
sensor networks should be resilient to this phenomena ensuring a correct infor-
mation exchange by means of correction codes and retransmissions, and ensuring
the survivability of the service despite unexpected node failures.
Finally, security is another big concern. Depending on the specific application
the data exchanged among the nodes might be sensitive. Furthermore, sensors
are often deployed in harsh environment and make use of standardized wireless
schemes and encodings. This allows potential attackers to gain unfair advantage,
acquiring information that should be kept secret or preventing a service from work-
ing correctly.
2.1.4 Constraints and Challenges
WSNs can be used for a wide array of applications, however their particular na-
ture poses notable challenges during the design phase of protocols and networks
in general. As it often happens, the typical challenges of a system clash, with the
design goals defined before.
The most important constraint of a sensor network is energy and it constitutes
the driving factor for many design choices. As we discussed before, in a typical
WSN nodes are powered by batteries. This means that energy is a scarce and pre-
cious resource that is inevitably going to deplete over time. For this reason opti-
mizing how the energy is spent is a fundamental problem for WSNs. Optimization
can be achieved in many different ways, from increasing the power density and the
efficiency of the cells within a battery, to dynamically adjusting operating voltages
and frequencies for the individual chips, to designing energy-aware protocols that
gracefully scale depending on the amount of residual energy.
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Another constraint that is characteristic of WSNs is computational power. Nodes
are equipped with highly optimized controller units, specifically designed to run
on low power embedded devices. A typical node uses processors running at fre-
quencies of 8-16 MHz and have on-board memory that goes from a few kilobytes
to a few megabytes. The trade-off is that usually the performance must be some-
what sacrificed to achieve acceptable energy consumption. As a result, the average
computational capabilities of a sensor node are limited and so is the complexity
of the tasks they can carry out. This ultimately impacts on the quality of software
designed for WSNs.
A third source of limitation is the transceiver itself. A transceiver is a complex
unit containing several non-trivial components which impact on the performance
and the price of a device. Furthermore, RF communication is a sophisticated tech-
nology with significant path loss, susceptible to interference and very energy de-
manding. This causes the transmission range of a sensor node to be between a few
meters and a few hundred meters.
Last but not least one of the driving factors of WSNs is cost. Sensor nodes are
meant to be small, inexpensive and easily replaceable. This further constraints the
decisions that can be taken when designing, implementing and deploying a WSN.
2.2 Energy-HarvestingWSNs
As discussed before, energy is one of the main constraint of WSN. Most of the de-
cisions taken when designing a sensor network are guided by the constant strug-
gle for energy, trying to put to good use every single unit of power. Thanks to the
advancement in technology and research, a new game-changing design has been
introduced: energy-harvesting wireless sensor networks (EH-WSNs).
EH-WSNs are regular WSNs where the main battery is supported by additional
energy sources, or even entirely replaced by them. The key idea is to reclaim the
energy present in the surroundings of a node, convert it to a usable form through
appropriate types of transducers and ultimately employ it to power the node itself.
If the energy source used to fuel the network is abundant and always present
15
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then, from a theoretical point of view, energy harvesting (EH) provides a network
with unlimited energy and an almost infinite lifespan, where the considerably less
common hardware failures become the main concern. As it is easy to imagine this
ideal scenario does not always match reality. Despite being a significant improve-
ment over regular sensor networks, EH-WSNs have their own unique challenges.
A comparison between the energy usage pattern of regular and EH nodes is
shown in Figure 2.4.
Time
Stored
Energy
Energy Harvesting
Battery
Figure 2.4: Energy usage comparison between battery operated and EH sen-
sor notes. The energy within the battery monotonically decreases, whereas the
EH node replenishes itself over time and uses the energy once there is enough
of it available. [73]
2.2.1 Types of Harvestable Energy
The Law of Conservation of Energy states that«The total amount of energy in an iso-
lated system remains constant over time». Energy however has many different forms,
and conversion techniques are never 100% efficient. This has two main contrast-
ing repercussions. First of all, if we were able to design a machinery that was able
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of perfect efficiency, i.e., transferring all the energy at the input to the output, we
could not have EH technologies because there would simply not be any energy to
scavenge in the first place. On the other hand if perfect efficiency is not an option it
means that some of the energy must be dissipated into other forms during the con-
version process. As a result we will have to harvest more than the nominal value of
energy required by the node to run in order to keep it powered.
If we were to measure the efficiency of different energy conversion processes
and we assume that the best known harvesting technology is always used, it is pos-
sible to rate how laborious it is to obtain a given amount of energy depending on
the source used. In other words, not all energy forms are created equal and some
of them are inherently harder or less convenient to harvest.
By far the most efficient and easy to harvest form of energy is solar, which relies
on to the photovoltaic effect. Using modern solar cells it is possible to harvest tens
of milliwatts per centimeter squared. However, this figure is only valid for near-
optimal situations where the solar cell is under direct sunlight. In indoor scenario
with artificial lighting the average value drops by several orders of magnitude. Solar
technology is the most predominantly used form of EH and is present in many
applications.
Another form of energy that can be harvested is wind. The airflow can be used
to activate small rotors or turbines which will then output power. The amount of
power achievable with this technology is around one milliwatt per cubic centime-
ter.
Electromagnetic radiation can also be harvested through special antennas called
rectennas and can provide a few hundred microwatts.
An interesting form of energy to harvest is vibrations. This is related to a mass
vibrating at a specific frequency for a given amount of time. Despite the basic idea
being the same, there are three main ways to harvest vibrations. The first is by using
the piezoelectric effect and piezoelectric materials such as quartz or Rochelle salt.
This kind of materials are able to accumulate electrical charge in response to me-
chanical stress. For example by inserting a piezoelectric transducer inside a shoe
the kinetic energy of a footfall will deform the transducer which in turns will pro-
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duce energy that can be harvested. A second way of obtaining energy through vi-
brations is by electrostatic conversion. This technique consists of externally charg-
ing the two plates of a capacitor and subsequently varying their distance. This
will result in a variation of charge that can be used to produce electrical energy.
This technique can be used to harvest energy from industrial machinery that vi-
brate while operating. The final method used in conjunction with vibrations is to
produce energy through electromagnetism. By moving a magnet inside a coil, an
electrical current is generated. This last technique can be used for example to har-
vest environmental vibrations. Depending on the technique used, the amount of
energy attainable through vibrations harvesting ranges from a few microwatts to
some milliwatts in highly specialized applications.
Another source of energy commonly used is the one obtainable from thermal
gradients which rely on the Peltier-Seebeck effect: when two dissimilar metals
with different temperatures are joined together, a voltage is generated. The amount
of energy that these sources can deliver varies from several tens to a few hundreds
of microwatts per unit size.
Finally, it is possible to harvest more exotic forms of energy such as the oxidation
of blood sugar or the metabolic energy of trees. However these are far less common
are are only used in very specialized applications.
Energy sources can also be described according to their characteristics [76] and
how easy they are to obtain. It would be highly impractical to have an extremely
good harvesting architecture for a source of energy that originates from highly in-
frequent phenomena. We define an energy source to be controllable if it can be
obtained when it is required, whereas non-controllable forms of energy can be scav-
enged when some external conditions are met and the specific event manifests it-
self. Similarly we define an energy source to be predictable if it manifests itself with
some kind of periodicity or if it possible to know its presence in advance. Unpre-
dictable energy sources behave in the exact opposite way and manifest themselves
without any pattern.
This concepts can be applied to the same form of energy arising from different
sources. While it is always true that solar energy is a non-controllable but pre-
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dictable form of energy, vibrations can have different configurations. Imagine the
vibrations produced by people moving inside an airport. In this highly complex
environment the energy source is non-controllable and unpredictable. On the
other hand consider the vibrations given off by some kind of machinery (e.g., a
rock tumbler), here presence of the energy directly relates to when the machin-
ery is turned on, making it a controllable source. Furthermore, the machine could
follow a predetermined operating cycle yielding a predictable source. Table 2.1
contains a condensed view of some examples of the different energy sources.
Energy Source Author Normalized VolumePower (μW) (mm3)
Vibration - piezoelectric Glynne-Jones et al. [33] 0.5 125
Vibration - piezoelectric Roundy et al. [71, 72] 28 1,000
Vibration - piezoelectric Roundy et al. [72] 50 1,000
Vibration - piezoelectric Marzencki et al. [56] 0.0007 2
Vibration - electrostatic Mitcheson et al. [58] 0.005 750
Vibration - electrostatic Despesse et al. [16] 27 1,800
Vibration - electrostatic Despesse et al. [16] 1.7 32
Vibration - electromagnetic Shearwood et al.[74] 4:7 10 8 5.4
Vibration - electromagnetic Glynne-Jones et al. [34] 7.7 840
Vibration - electromagnetic Perpetuum Ltd. [53] 25,000 30,000
Thermoelectric Applied 50 41digital solutions [10]
Airflow Park and Chou [64] 50,000 100,000
Solar (outdoor) 20,000 500,000
Solar (indoor) 1,500 500,000
Table 2.1: Comparison of different sources of energy. [32] [76]
2.2.2 Energy Usage
Another peculiar aspect of EH-WSNs is how the energy is actually consumed.
This can be done according to the architecture, which can be either harvest-use or
harvest-store-use. As it is possible to see in Figures 2.5 and 2.6 the latter requires
additional components to be realized.
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Energy Harvesting
Sensor Node
Figure 2.5: The harvest-use paradigm. The energy coming from the harvest-
ing unit is directly used to power the node.
Energy Harvesting
Main Storage Sensor NodeBackup Storage
Figure 2.6: The harvest-store-use paradigm. The energy coming from the
harvester is stockpiled into the main storage unit. Optionally a backup unit
can be used for long term storage.
In the harvest-use architecture all the energy scavenged is directly employed to
power the sensor node. As a result, as soon as the energy level falls below the min-
imum operating threshold, the node will shutdown and come back online only
when enough energy is available again. Another caveat of this architecture is that
all the energy that is not used by the system is wasted. This means that in case of
abundant energy it is not possible to stockpile any of it.
On the contrary the harvest-store-use architecture addresses this limitation by
introducing an energy storage device. This device acts as a buffer in a producer-
consumer paradigm: it is charged by the energy harvester (producer) and dis-
charged by the node (consumer), effectively decoupling them. When the produc-
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tion rate is less than or equal to the consumption rate, then the harvest-store-use
architecture behaves like harvest-use. On the other hand if the energy available is
more than the energy required, then the excess can be saved to be used at a later
time. Additionally, a second backup storage device such as a rechargeable battery
can be used for even longer term storage.
These two architecture have different characteristics and they are suited for dif-
ferent scenarios. Imagine an application based upon non-controllable and unpre-
dictable energy source such as monitoring traffic by having cars run over a piezo-
electric strip on the tarmac. In this case the average energy level will be low and
nodes will only be energized by the presence of a car hitting the transducer. This
application is well suited for an harvest-use architecture and does not benefit from
the increased cost of having additional components. If we instead think about a
temperature monitoring application, out in a field and powered by solar energy,
here we can see how having an energy buffer can help keeping the network alive
and functional even during nighttime. The downside of this approach is the in-
creased cost and complexity of a single node.
2.2.3 Energy Neutrality
As discussed before, the energy consumption of a node is connected to its activ-
ity, which depends upon many factors. The most effective way of adjusting it is by
varying the DC. Keeping a node switched off obviously saves energy, however it
also means that less tasks can be carried out. The balance between tasks perfor-
mance and energy consumption is known as energy neutrality [82]. More specif-
ically if at a given harvesting rate and activity level, a node can remain powered on
for an indefinite amount of time, then it is said to be in energy neutral operation
(ENO) state. If besides achieving ENO a node can also achieve maximum task
performance, the node is said to be in the maximum performance energy neutral
operation (ENO-Max) state.
As a result, in the context of EH-WSN, tracking the consumption of a node and
varying its DC is a good technique for achieving the ENO state. By defining and
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minimizing an appropriate cost function, it is possible to obtain an optimal duty-
cycle schedule. For example the cost function suggested in [82] is
lim
N!1
1
N
NX
t=1
(Bt   B0)2
whereB0 2 [0; 1] is the initial battery level andBt is the battery level at the discrete
time step t.
The ENO state is a key property of EH-WSNs, and every protocol and imple-
mentation should strive to achieve it.
2.3 WSNClassification
A WSN can be structured and organized in one of several different ways, accord-
ing to the characteristics and the number of its component. We will now describe
some of the most common configurations and arrangements for WSNs.
2.3.1 Network Topology and Architecture
As showed previously in Figure 2.1 the typical architecture consists of a single sink,
connected to the sensor nodes via a single-hopormulti-hopnetwork. The difference
is that in single-hop networks (Figure 2.7) each node can directly communicate
with the base station. This can greatly simplify the protocols required for the net-
work to function. However, the size of a single-hop network is also limited by the
communication range of the nodes. On the contrary, in multi-hop networks the
distance between a node and the sink can be greater than one hop, hence the name.
Multi-hop networks can cover much greater areas, but they require message for-
warding infrastructures and non trivial routing algorithms making the whole sys-
tem more complicated and, in general, more energy demanding.
Multi-hop networks can be further subdivided according to their internal or-
ganization. In a network where all the nodes are equal and have the same duties
we talk about a flat network, this has the same arrangement shown previously in
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Sink Node
Sensor Node
Communication Line
Figure 2.7: Single-hop architecture, each sensor node is in direct reach of the
sink node.
Figure 2.1.
On the other hand in a hierarchical network we have a subdivision into one-hop
groups called clusters where regular nodes relay their messages to special nodes
called cluster headswhich are responsible for the whole group (Figure 2.8). Cluster
heads will then form a higher tier network to communicate and forward messages
to the sink. The difference between regular nodes and cluster heads can be both
logical and physical. For example we could have a dynamic protocol that elects
cluster leaders in a distributed manner, e.g., according to their energy level. The
process is then repeated for a cluster when the head is running out of power. An-
other possibility is to use a network with special nodes that have increased energy
capabilities (i.e., more batteries or larger batteries). These nodes will be used as
cluster heads. The added complexity of a hierarchical network is payed off by ad-
vantages in terms of performance and scalability. Each regular node has to com-
municate (generally) with a one-hop cluster head, and will not have to forward any
message from other nodes. Data aggregation is also typical in this kind of architec-
ture. The cluster head can consolidate multiple messages into a single one, either
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by means of an aggregation function such as averaging, or by grouping messages
into a single super-message and transmitting that in one operation. Additionally,
load balancing is also an option, increasing the scalability of large networks.
Cluster Communication Line
Node Communication Line
Cluster Head
Sensor Node
Sink Node
Figure 2.8: Multi-hop hierarchical architecture. The cluster heads form a
higher tier layer.
It is worth noting that the concept of clustering can be further expanded in two
directions. In one case it is possible to have a multi-hop architecture within a single
cluster, while the second possibility is to have multi-tiered architecture by subdi-
viding clusters into lower lever clusters up to an arbitrary number of times.
2.3.2 Types of WSNs
Regardless of the specific architecture, the overall organization of the network is
also depending on the specific characteristics of its component.
Starting with mobility, individual nodes may or may not have the ability of mov-
ing around the network. In one case we talk of static networks whereas in the other
case we have mobile networks. In static network the connection graph formed by
the different nodes is well defined and does not change over time, except for nodes
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permanently leaving the network due to hardware failures or battery depletion.
This allows to compute routing tables once and use the for most of the lifespan
of the network. However, static networks might become disconnected if a large
enough number of nodes, or few hub nodes, cease to work. This is most notable
for the nodes in close proximity of the sink, which will have to handle a consider-
ably higher amount of traffic compered to peripheral nodes. On the contrary, in
mobile networks, the nodes can move around either in a predictable manner, for
example in the case of motorized autonomous nodes or in an unpredictable fash-
ion, such as nodes attached to animals or people. This creates an additional layer of
complexity and increases the cost, especially if the nodes are not moving “for free”
on an independent autonomous carrier, but require dedicated hardware. Depend-
ing on the application, the routing could be simplified and effectively reduced to
a single-hop network if all the nodes can consistently get in direct transmission
range of a collection point (i.e., sink).
The concept of mobility can be applied to BSs as well. As with static networks,
in the case of static-sink networks the connection graph is well defined and similar
techniques can be used. In mobile-sink networks is the BS to move around in order
to collect data. The advantage of this technique is that the added complexity of the
system is on the sink node and not on every single sensor node. With this configu-
ration the nodes do not require any modification and can wait for the sink to get in
range and dump all their collected data. One disadvantage of this technique is that
if the collection rate is not high enough nodes might run out of memory to collect
data. Depending on the application, this problem can be mitigated by aggregating
the data.
The most common kind of sensor networks only have one sink and is therefore
called single-sink. This is an inexpensive solution and makes data collection easier
for the end user. However, depending on the size of the network, it causes a con-
siderable amount of packets to be relayed by other nodes, resulting in significant
energy consumption. By adding other sinks we have what is called a multi-sink
network. These are effectively separate networks where each node reports to its
closest BS. If the different sinks are positioned in strategic points the load of the
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network can be better balanced and its lifespan increased. Furthermore, having
multiple sinks also provide some redundancy allowing the networks to survive a
sink failure by recomputing its routing paths. A disadvantage of this technique is
the increased cost, especially considering that a single BS is orders of magnitude
more expensive than a sensor node.
Another way of classifying networks is according to the placement of the nodes.
If nodes are deployed in random positions within the sensing area, we talk of an
unstructured network. This is the norm for WSNs as it is generally unfeasible or
too expensive to carefully plan the positioning of each node. However, if this is
done, we have what is known as a structured network. In this case it is generally
possible to take advantage of the placement of the nodes and optimize the network
in some way, for example having the largest area coverage with the minimal number
of nodes.
Finally, a network can be either non-adaptive or adaptive. In the former case
nodes are statically configured and are not able to self-organize into a network.
Non-adaptive networks are normally used only in small deployments where the
number of nodes is contained. On the other hand, adaptive networks do not re-
quire any external intervention, and can organize into a fully functioning network
by themselves. This is a very useful property since, as discussed, WSNs are highly
dynamic, and nodes can part and join at a considerable rate.
As it can be seen there are many ways of configuring a sensor network. However,
in the end is always the application that dictates the constraints, what can and can
not be done or what kind of configuration is the best match for the scenario at
hand. This is a key fact in WSNs that, as we will see in the rest of this dissertation,
will show up time and again.
2.4 Protocol Stack
The internal organization of a single node, and by extension of the whole network,
is fundamental to understand how a WSN works and how it can achieve better
performance.
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2.4.1 Layer Organization
Similarly to regular computer networks, WSNs tend to be organized in layers. Like
in the open systems interconnection (OSI) stack, each layer makes use of the ser-
vices from the layer underneath and provides services to the layer above. The typ-
ical layers of a WSN are: Physical, Data Link, Network, Transport and Application
as shown in Figure 2.9.
Application
Transport
Network
Data Link
Physical
Power Management
Connection Management
Task Management
Layers
Planes
Figure 2.9: Layers and planes organization of a single node. [1]
The physical layer is fundamentally the interface between the node/sink and
the outside world. The goal of this layer is to convert back and forth between bits
and radio signals. Among other things this layer will have to concern itself with
choosing an appropriate transmission band and frequency, producing the modu-
lation and demodulation and implementing techniques such as clear channel as-
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sessment (CCA) and received signal strength indicator (RSSI). These can be used
to analyze the energy level of a given spectrum and compare it to its noise floor
to establish whether or not the medium is busy with an ongoing communication.
Furthermore, RSSI can also be used to estimate the distance of a node.
Data Link layer has as its main tasks to establish connections (generally pair-
wise) between nodes in direct communication ranges. This layer is fundamental
for ensuring a fair usage of the medium while addressing concerns such as energy
consumption, communication delay and throughput. How and when the medium
is accessed, how contentions are resolved and what to do in case of collisions is all
decided in the subsection of the data link layer known as medium access control
(MAC).
Moving up we find the network layer. This layer is responsible for routing, that
is establishing connection between any two nodes that need to communicate and
that are separated by two or more hops. It is here that routing tables are built and
maintained by taking into account numerous parameters coming from the specific
application such as network topology, usage patterns, network density and so on.
Transport is the next layer and it is responsible for providing reliability to the
connection. Depending on the application different properties could be required.
A few examples are delivery guarantee, in-order delivery and congestion control.
The final layer is application. This includes the main application running on
each node. Currently there are no standardized application protocol and as a result
each specific application can be considered as a different implementation of this
layer.
2.4.2 Plane Organization
Together with layers, in Figure 2.9, we find an orthogonal division into planes. This
has become more and more common over time. Planes represent portion of the
system dedicated to addressing specific tasks and achieving specific goals, inde-
pendent of the layer division.
The most common planes are Power Management, Connection Management and
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Task Management.
The power management plane is responsible for administering the energy reser-
voir of a node. For example it can suggest when to turn off the radio in order to save
power, or which neighbor to choose in order to obtain an energy efficient route.
The connection management plane is used to allow single nodes to organize
into a network. It can dictate how the nodes should self-configure upon joining
and how previously existing nodes should react. Similarly when nodes part the
network due to them being mobile or because of some kind of failure, this plane
suggests how the reconfiguration should happen.
Finally, we have the task management plane which is used to optimally share
the different task of the network among all the nodes. This is done by taking into
account their capabilities and the parameters of the network as a whole including
the topology and how the actual phenomena under observation are organized.
2.4.3 Holistic Approach
Although the layer division used in WSNs is similar to the one used in regular
networks, it is highly inefficient to use the same protocols unmodified. The rea-
son for this is that the protocols used in regular networks have fundamentally dif-
ferent goals. More complex functionality such as automatic retransmissions and
quality of service (QoS) are provided. However, the price to pay for this is an
increased energy consumption, which, as we discussed, is a premium resource in
WSNs. To address the problem, many specific protocols for each different layer
have been developed and are used in different applications. However, in some
cases the layered approach used in the highly specialized protocols is more of a
legacy than a conscious choice. In this direction, the introduction of planes is a
tentative to move away from an airtight compartmentalized approach and towards
a more cross-platform solution.
Taking this a step further leads to what is usually referred to as holistic approach.
Here the layer division is much more relaxed and limited to the core functionality
of each layer, whereas any other relevant information is made available to every
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other subsystem so that interaction and optimization can be maximized. Since
WSNs are extremely energy sensitive, being able to incorporate this information
in as many places as possible and having it guide as many decisions as possible
allows for better performance across the whole system.
Regardless of what approach is used, there are chances of running into security
issues. This is what we will discuss in the next chapter.
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The explosion of companies deploying wireless networks inse-
curely is creating vulnerabilities, as they think it’s limited to the
office - then they have JohnnyHacker in the parking lotwith an
802:11 antenna using the network to send threatening emails
to the president!
Kevin Mitnick
3
Security inWireless Sensor Networks
Many times WSNs and EH-WSNs are used to monitor and convey sensitivedata or to run dependable services. It is not uncommon for security to be
critical within a WSN application and therefore, over the past years, it has been a
hot research topic.
Just like in regular computer security the three most important properties and
goals of a good security suite are confidentiality, integrity and availability. These are
well known security concepts and their meaning is the following
Confidentiality access to data and resources should be granted only to the right-
ful actors
Integrity the data present within the system should never be inappropriately mod-
ified, neither intentionally nor because of unpredictable errors
Availability services and information should be available whenever they are re-
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quested
There are many other properties that can be achieved by a secure system, how-
ever the so calledCIA properties are the most widely accepted “minimum require-
ments”. These definitions are used because they capture the essence of the problem
(e.g., not to have eavesdroppers on a confidential channel), but are also general
enough to abstract from the implementation and the specific details.
Security is a highly complex topic which touches upon many aspects of a single
system, from the software to the hardware, trough each one of the layers. Being
able to describe required properties with one definition, independent of how the
actual property is realized, is fundamental.
3.1 Attacks and Attackers for (EH-)WSNs
We start our analysis by discussing the importance and need for a well organized
and formally usable classifications of attacks and attackers.
3.1.1 The Importance of Classification
Security in the field of WSNs is an extensive topic and can be tackled from a wide
variety of angles and through many different aspects. A useful tool to have in this
case is a thorough classification, a taxonomy of attacks more specifically. Thanks
to that it is possible to systematically describe the key properties that an attacker
needs in order to mount specific attacks, analyze how the composition of such
properties allows for the implementation of more complex attacks, and identify
where to intervene in order to have maximum efficiency. Furthermore, a classifica-
tion is required to set the path for formal methods, security analysis and automatic
provers.
This approach is not new, however, the addition of EH capabilities gives a new
spin to the topic, requiring new considerations, introduction of new properties and
adjustments to old ones.
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3.1.2 A Taxonomy of Attacks
The taxonomy that we developed [19] is specifically tailored to include EH-WSNs.
The key idea is to divide possible attacks using so called dimensions. A dimension
defines a parameter and helps with analyzing what an attacker can do by varying
each parameter. The three main dimensions are time, presence and intervention.
The time dimension defines the duration of an attack, this spans from a few sec-
onds for eavesdropping a message or jamming the channel, all the way to many
hours or days in the case of offline brute-force attacks. Presence describes the po-
sition that an attacker can occupy within a network and, as described also in [55],
ranges from local where only one or a few components of the network can be af-
fected, to distributedwhere multiple local components are interested, all the way to
global where the attacker has complete simultaneous access to the whole network.
The third dimension, intervention, defines the possible actions that an attacker can
take against a system. Extending the ones defined in [5], we introduce the follow-
ing possibilities:
• Disabling - the ability to temporary remove nodes from the network;
• Destruction - the ability to permanently disable one or more nodes;
• Eavesdropping - the ability to listen to and store exchanged messages;
• Data Knowledge - the ability to acquire data from one or more nodes;
• Partial Data Modification - the ability to interfere with the data stored
within a node (usually through external access);
• CompleteDataModification - the ability to completely and arbitrarily change
the data content of a node;
• Reprogramming - the ability to completely and arbitrarily change the code
content of a node;
• Node Injection - the ability to add nodes, under the control of the attacker,
to the network;
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• EnergyReduction - the ability to starve a node, preventing it to use its main
energy source;
• Energy Exploitation - the ability to maliciously take advantage of the cur-
rent energy level of a node;
Unlike what presented is in [5], the new list of interventions does not form a
lattice under the requires ordering. Instead, as displayed in Figure 3.1, it is a lower
semilattice given that there is not a supremum, mainly due to the addition of the
energy related interventions.
Injection
Reprogramming
Complete Data Modification
Partial Data Modification Data Knowledge
Destruction
Disabling
Eavesdropping
Energy Exploitation
Energy Reduction
f;g
Figure 3.1: Lower semilattice of the interventions, extension of [5].
By mixing and matching different properties and capabilities it is possible to
generate various attacker models. As said before this can be done systematically
and procedurally in order to obtain provable properties about a given system. Take
for example the famous Dolev-Yao attacker model [21], here the adversary can
eavesdrop, capture and forge any message. This model can be represented as a
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combination of {(Global, Eavesdropping), (Local, Reprogramming)}, using the first
part to model the fact that its knowledge of the exchanged messages is total, and
the second to model the fact that it can be an insider. A preliminary result of this
classification is that EH-WSNs and the attacks possible therein, can not be fully
modeled by the Dolev-Yao attacker. Let us briefly. discuss why
3.1.3 The Cyber-Physical Attacker
The commonly adopted Dolev-Yao attacker model is a good starting point for reg-
ular and EH WSNs, however this model is sometimes too powerful for this setting
while it does not cover other important aspects. Threats like data knowledge and
reprogramming must be taken into account. If we analyze a network purely from
a protocol definition point of view, it is possible to see that if an attacker is capa-
ble of Eavesdropping, Data Knowledge, and some kind of Data Modification, he
can effectively reprogram a node, but with less effort than having to have physical
access.
Being able to know how a legitimate node would react to a specific type of mes-
sages gives the attacker a non negligible advantage towards breaking the protocol,
for example by forging appropriate malicious responses. Moreover, due to the un-
stable nature of EH-WSNs, destruction capabilities may not be needed. By taking
advantage of the fact that nodes might be in a temporary sleeping state due to lack
of energy, it is possible to mount what we later on introduce as the sleepwalker at-
tack, where a node is maliciously replaced by the attacker only during the period
of time while it is inactive. At the same time, the idea of energy reduction does
not produce Destruction like in regular WSNs, but rather it yields only Disabling
because of the harvesting mechanism.
Intercepting messages might also require some adjustments. Given the broad-
cast nature of sensor networks it is hard for the attacker to reliably receive a mes-
sage while preventing any other node from doing so. If a node is physically close
enough to the attacker, it will receive the same messages that the attacker will re-
ceive and preventing that would cause both of them not to receive anything.
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The notion of globality must also be applied in a slightly different way since,
again, it is possible for large portions of the network to be effectively inactive for
very long periods of time, or simply the sheer size of a sensor network might make
this objective unfeasible. For example monitoring the traffic of the entire network
might prove to be considerably costly.
Generally, as a result we believe that by combining the properties listed in our
taxonomy is it possible to define a Cyber-physical attacker, that is indeed required
in order to obtain correct formal models and to analyze security properties. This
is out of the scope of this dissertation and is further discussed in [18] and more
extensively in [81].
3.2 Taxonomy Application
We now take advantage of the taxonomy we introduced in the previous section
to classify and describe some of the classic attacks in WSNs [42, 84] and their re-
spective attackers. We will follow a layer-oriented approach using the definitions
introduced in Section 2.4.1. The idea here is to characterize and formalize these
well-known attacks by breaking them down into the interaction of basic compo-
nents.
Attacks will be described as a set of tuples where each component identifies the
dimensions of time, presence and intervention. For simple attacks only one tuple
is used, while in case of more complex attacks each element of the set will model a
specific aspect.
Further, a general overview and classification of the presented attacks is dis-
played in Figure 3.4.
3.2.1 Physical Layer
We start our classification at the bottom of the stack with the physical layer. This
layer allows to establish the physical link between two nodes and intervenes in the
selection of appropriate frequencies, modulation schemes and symbol generation
among the others.
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We start with eavesdropping which can be considered an attack in and of itself.
Thanks to the broadcast nature of RF, an attacker with a receiving radio tuned to
the same frequency used by a transmitting node can listen on and record any ongo-
ing communication. If the traffic is not encrypted and the attacker knows the pro-
tocol it is possible for him to make sense out of if. Even if the protocol is unknown
but the traffic is still unencrypted, it is possible to reverse engineer the packet for-
mat. The adversary required for this attack is very simple and is defined as {(*, *,
Eavesdropping)}. This means that the more time and effort the attacker puts in,
the more effective the attack will be.
Similar to the previous attack we have what is normally called traffic analysis.
The way of performing this attack is the same, a receiver is used to listen to the
channel to obtain information. However, the main goal in different. While in
eavesdropping the attacker set out to gather data from each packet, with traffic
analysis the goal is to understand how the traffic is shaped, in which direction do
the packets travel, which are the nodes that handle the highest number of pack-
ets, whether there are nodes that exclusively communicate with a specific subset
of other nodes, etc. This can be performed by counting the messages exchanged
and by looking at the meta-data usually contained within the header of a message.
The attacker required to mount traffic analysis is the same described before {(*, *,
Eavesdropping)}.
The two attacks described so far are normally referred to as passive attacks. This
is because these attacks do not cause direct harm to the system and the adversary
is merely an observer. However, they provide precious information about where
more harmful active attacks should be directed. By knowing which are the high
value targets it is possible for the attacker to better organize and focus his efforts.
All the attacks that we will describe from here on are active attacks and therefore
will have practical repercussions on the network.
The third attack for the physical layer is jamming. As we pointed out before, the
wireless medium is broadcast by nature and given its specifications anyone could
intentionally interfere with the communication between two nodes simply using a
strong enough transmitter that can reduce the signal-to-noise ratio below accept-
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able levels, thus preventing data exchange. Being this a physical attack, it can be
classified in many different ways according to the hardware used by the attacker.
The time dimension can span all the way from short to long and the presence can
go from local to, theoretically, global. Only the disabling intervention is required.
The attacker can then be modeled as {(*, *, Disabling)}.
Another attack related to the physical layer is tampering, which consists in gain-
ing access to the content of a node with the possibility of modifying such content.
The tuple for this attacker is {(*, Local, Reprogramming)}. On the other hand for
a milder version of tampering when the attacker can only dump the content of a
node {(*, Local, Data Knowledge)} will suffice.
3.2.2 Data Link Layer
The data link layer is appointed to establish a link between two nodes within direct
communication range. It is a fundamental layer for WSNs and we will discuss more
about it in the following sections.
The first attack that can be mounted in this layer is collision exploitation. Know-
ing the underlying protocol it is possible for an attacker to send the right message
at the right moment, causing a collision and making packets unintelligible. This
might trigger costly re-transmission procedures, decreasing the overall through-
put or effectively removing a node from the network. Assuming that the protocol
knowledge is an offline effort for the attacker, the resulting tuple is {(Short, Local,
Eavesdropping), (Short, Local, Disabling)}.
A direct consequence of the previous attack is called exhaustion. Technically the
attack implementation can be considered the same, but the goal is to deplete the
energy of a node through repeated collisions and therefore the associated attacker
is {(Short, Local, Energy Reduction)}.
Another important attack is the so called replay attack. Here overheard data
packets are sent unaltered either to the same target node or to a different one, in
order to exploit non idempotent operations such as path construction in routing
algorithms and data aggregation in applications. The attacker required to perform
38
3.2. TAXONOMY APPLICATION
replay should be {(Short, Local, Eavesdropping), (Short, Distributed, Partial Data
Modification)}.
We will discuss the replay attack in further details in Chapter 5, where we will
introduce a new version of it that we call the beacon replay attack.
3.2.3 Networking Layer
The next layer is the networking layer whose purpose is to connect two nodes that
are not directly in range and hence require the forwarding of packets through mul-
tiple links or hops.
In order for routing algorithms to work properly, appropriate information must
be propagated throughout the whole network. This is a typical entry point for
spoofing attacks where the values are somehow forged or altered, so that imprecise
information are sent out. This attack can have several effects: use of sub-optimal
paths, introduction of routing loops and, in some cases, even the partition of the
network. For an attacker to deploy such attacks it is required to feed the victim
nodes with fake information. This yields the tuple {(Medium, Local, Partial Data
Modification)}. The time dimension is dependent of the actual protocol used and
how the information are propagated.
Next we will describe a series of attacks that build upon the possibility of modi-
fying routing information. They all share a great deal of similarity, but each one of
them has slightly different goals.
The first one is known as the sinkhole attack, which allows one single node to
attract all or most of the traffic within the network. The attacker might not be able
to access the content of the collected packets, but this is not a key requirement.
If besides collecting messages the attacker also drops them all, the resulting at-
tack is the so called blackhole attack. This kind of attack is however very invasive
making it easier to discover. Nonetheless, if the attacker has enough knowledge
about the network and wants to selectively take out specific nodes it could deploy
a selective forwarding attack, where only the messages belonging to specific nodes
are dropped.
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More involved attacks can be performed, for example the sybil attack in Fig-
ure 3.2 is achieved by advertising multiple identities to other nodes. Depending
on the networking algorithm used, this could have a major impact on routing ta-
bles and path calculation.
I1
I2
I3
u v Sybil node
Regular node
Virtual node
Figure 3.2: Sybil attack, a Sybil node (blue) sends messages to regular nodes
(u, v) claiming different identities (I1, I2, I3).
Another quite effective attack is the so calledwormhole attack (Figure 3.3) where
two or more nodes collude to make packets appear in different portions of the net-
work at a much faster speed than what would normally happen by simply relaying
those packets through other nodes. This is typically obtained by using an addi-
tional low latency channel between the attackers.
The first result of this is that some nodes are mislead into believing that there are
specific nodes in their immediate neighborhood when this is not the case. Again,
depending on the networking algorithm employed, these nodes could represent
better choices from a routing point of view and the victims of the attack may try to
communicate with them directly. The result in this case are dropped packets due
to time-to-live expiration or similar mechanisms taking place.
The sinkhole attack only requires knowledge about what packets to capture,
therefore its related attacker requires {(Long, Local, Reprogramming), (*, Global,
Data Knowledge)}. The other attacks instead aim at disrupting other nodes more
actively and they substitute Data Knowledge for Partial Data Modification.
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Figure 3.3: Wormhole attack, here two nodes collude through a low latency
channel to quickly transfer packages across the network and invalidate routing
information.
All these attacks can be mounted by the same general attacker who has the capa-
bilities discussed above: {(Long, Local, Reprogramming), (*, Global, Partial Data
Modification)}.
3.2.4 Denial of Service
A special mention must be made for denial of service (DoS) attacks. These are
attacks against the availability of the service which use many different techniques.
Because of the fact that each layer and component of a given service must be work-
ing in order for the whole service to be available, DoS can be implemented in many
different ways at each different layer. For example an attacker with physical access
to a node could render it unusable and thus preventing any kind of application
from running.
Another possibility is to exploit the MAC protocol, this can be done by selec-
tively jamming specific control messages that allow nodes to synchronize, or just
by advertising an extremely long transmission thus making all the other nodes to
power down for a considerable amount of time.
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The blackhole and wormhole attacks that we introduced before are other forms
of DoS attacks. By dropping all the packets, either directly or by taking advantage
of the expiration mechanism of the underlying routing protocol has the direct ef-
fect of shutting down all the communications and therefore the whole application
is compromised.
As a result, each different method and technique used for achieving DoS can be
modeled in a slightly different way. However, if we abstract from the actual imple-
mentation of the attack and focus on its main goal of undermining availability, we
can derive two types of attacker. In one case we have a physical attacker that can
access enough nodes and permanently disable them, this is defined as {(Medium,
Distributed, Destruction)}. On the other hand we have a non-physical attacker
that has enough knowledge of the protocols used by the application, that he can
take advantage of them by preventing the exchange of messages for a sustained
period of time. This kind of attacker is defined as {(*, Distributed, Disabling)}.
3.2.5 Attacks Specific to EH-WSNs
While these attacks are general for regular WSNs, new ones can be described specif-
ically for EH-WSNs. They do not fall in the description of typical attacks, but we
would like to introduce the concept here for the sake of completeness.
For example the approach used in [79] chooses opportune encryption algo-
rithms and key lengths according to the amount of energy currently available. Fur-
thermore, some QoS is provided by assigning priorities to different packets and
using the available energy to relay high priority ones first. If we introduce here an
attacker with {(Medium, Local, Energy Exploitation), (Short, Local, Eavesdrop-
ping)} it would be possible to passively analyze the traffic according to the current
level of energy and monitor what is the typical behavior of the system when nodes
have low energy, assuming that the messages exchanged in this state will be almost
only high priority ones. This might also reveal a fruitful strategy in case that some
of the nodes are involved in a high number of transmissions of important message,
as these might be worth attacking further. Moreover, if we allow the attacker also
42
3.2. TAXONOMY APPLICATION
the possibility of energy reduction, it would be possible to maliciously lower the
amount of energy of specific nodes, in order to force a particular mode which may
include weaker encryption algorithm or a shorter key.
Another example is the idea presented in [65], where the authors note that by
using stream ciphers it is possible to precompute the key stream. This allows for a
trade-off between memory and energy. Some bytes can be precomputed when the
energy availability is high, and used up when it is low. Depending on the communi-
cation scheme used in the network an attacker defined by the tuple {(Short, Local,
Data Knowledge)} could obtain the precomputed bytes and use them in the fu-
ture. The attack can be made even more effective if we also allow energy reduction
with {(Medium, Local, Energy Reduction), (Short, Local, Data Knowledge)}. By
controlling the energy amount of a node the attacker is forcing its victim to use
the precomputed stream effectively behaving like {(Medium | Long, Distributed,
Data Knowledge)}, but with considerably less effort.
Finally similar attacks can be re-implemented and require different attackers
in the EH scenario. For example the exhaustion attack defined before requires a
continuous effort from the attacker and goes from {(Short, Local, Energy Reduc-
tion)} to {(Long, Local, Energy Reduction)}.
Attacks on WSNs
Active AttacksPassive Attacks
Traﬃc AnalysisEavesdropping
ReplayExhaustionCollision ExploitationTamperingJamming
EH Related AttacksDenial of ServiceSink/Gray/Sybil/WormSpooﬁng
Figure 3.4: Overview of the presented attacks.
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3.3 Security of theData Link Layer
After having discussed known and common attacks in general, we will now delve
into one of the layers of WSNs, namely the data link layer and analyze it in greater
detail. MAC protocols belong to this layer and are delegated to establishing a con-
nection between two neighboring nodes, i.e., two nodes that are physically in range
one another. As a result MAC protocols have the all important task of controlling
the radio activity: deciding when to send and receive messages, handling colli-
sions and taking care of re-transmissions. These tasks are central for the energy ef-
ficiency of a sensor network, in fact the radio is by far the most energy demanding
component [3], as can be seen in Figure 3.5 hence a proper handling can guarantee
considerable energy savings. Furthermore, the problem of maintaining the radio
switched on while awaiting for incoming traffic, commonly known as idle listening,
is also addressed by MAC protocols.
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Figure 3.5: Typical energy consumption of the components of a sensor node
during activity (Radio CC2500 and MCU MSP430) [3].
As a result, security in MAC protocols is also very important. Being able to
manipulate control messages enables an attacker to mount a wide variety of attacks
as described in Section 3.1.
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3.4 Data Link Layer andMACProtocols
In order to understand and design effective security solutions for MAC protocols,
it is important to have some insight on their key properties and how they work in
general. We will discuss this next. Therefore, we enter into a short digression to
explain how MAC protocols work.
The very first MAC protocols used to keep the radio component constantly on.
While this was a near-optimal scenario in terms of throughput and delay, it yielded
extremely high energy consumption. As a result this behavior quickly ceased in
favor of a technique that allowed nodes to enter low-power or sleeping modes ac-
cording to specific parameters. We introduced this before asduty-cycling and it pro-
vides significant energy savings. However, while being extremely effective, duty-
cycling, makes establishing a connection much harder. The problem of finding a
neighbor to connect to is now augmented in the time direction since such neigh-
bor might be inactive when a message is ready to be sent. Sophisticated techniques
have been developed to address this issue.
Typically, MAC protocols that perform duty-cycling are organized in two large
categories: synchronous andasynchronous, depending how duty-cycling is performed.
In the former, nodes wake-up and fall asleep with a predetermined frequency while
in the latter there is no such constraint and the nodes are free to self-organize. Syn-
chronous protocols usually provide good communication guarantees, but at the
cost of higher energy usage because nodes are forced to wake up and perform a
run of the protocol even it no message is present. Asynchronous protocols on the
other hand are much more flexible from that point of view and allow pairs of node
to establish a specific duty-cycling pattern that can optimize message exchanges.
Moreover, asynchronous protocols are further divided into two subcategories
known as preamble based and beacon based or, more commonly, sender-initiated
(SI) and receiver-initiated (RI) respectively. The three different approaches are
summarized in Figure 3.6.
In the preamble based scheme, whenever a node wants to transmit a frame it will
first send a message called preamble, and then wait for a potential receiver to wake
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Figure 3.6: Three different approaches to using duty-cycles: synchronous,
sender-initiated and receiver-initiated.
up. When and if this happens, the receiver answers by means of an acknowledg-
ment (ACK), thus interrupting the preamble and establishing a connection. The
main problem of this technique is that the listening for an ACK and transmitting
the message afterwards can take a considerable amount of time, and require for the
on-board transceiver, the most energy demanding component, to be switched on
for the entire period.
On the other hand we have the RI paradigm, first introduced by Lin et al. [51]
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in 2004 and later popularized by Sun et al. [77] in 2008. This family of protocols
acts in a somehow specular manner when compared to SI. Instead of sending out a
long preamble, a node willing to receive data will issue a very short message, called
a beacon. This message will inform potential senders of the presence of an available
receiver. As shown in [25, 51, 77], this leads to a more efficient energy usage and,
in turns, lower consumption.
3.5 Security Suites
As it is normal to expect, the MAC layer is also the building block for every net-
working protocol since a path between any two nodes is nothing more than a col-
lection of links between neighboring nodes. As a result of this, security at the data
link layer is extremely important and a number of solutions have been developed
over the years to address that. The most well-known security suite for WSNs are
SPINS [67] and TinySec [43]. Others also exist and we will discuss them briefly.
3.5.1 SPINS
SPINS is a complete security suite for sensor networks that provides confidential-
ity, authentication, integrity and freshness. We discussed the first three properties
in previous sections. With regard to data freshers it is informally defined as a guar-
antee that the messages sent within the network are recent and are not duplicate
of previous messages. SPINS is composed by secure network encryption protocol
(SNEP) and micro timed efficient stream loss-tolerant authentication (μTESLA).
The first component, SNEP, is a low overhead encryption protocol. It provides
semantic security (also known as indistinguishability under chosen plain-text at-
tack (IND-CPA)), data authentication, replay protection and weak message fresh-
ness. SNEP makes use of a single symmetric cipher as building block for all the
cryptographic operation such as encryption and authentication. The cipher used
in the original implementation is RC5 [68] and cipher block chaining message au-
thentication code (CBC-MAC) is used for message authentication. Separate keys
are used for encryption, authentication and random number generation. Each one
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of these keys is derived from a master key shared by the BS and the node.
Plain 1 Plain 3 PadIV Plain 2
Ek
Cipher 1
Ek
Cipher 2
Ek
Cipher 3
Figure 3.7: Encryption with CBC mode of operation. Each block is xored
with the previous block before encryption. If the last block is not a multiple of
the block-size it may cause cipher-text expansion.
Each pair of nodes exchanging information maintains a counter that is increased
by one after each successful message exchange. The counter is implicit, in the sense
that it is never transmitted, but in case of desynchronization, a separate exchange
protocol is run. This is how SNEP achieves freshness. Furthermore, the counter
is also used as part of the input to the encryption process thus providing semantic
security.
If required, strong freshness (a version of freshness that provides a total or-
der on a request-response pair) can also be obtained. This is done by having the
sender generate and transmit the authenticated version of a random nonce and a
request message. The receiver answers with the authenticated version of the same
nonce and a response message. Upon verifying the authentication code, the sender
knows that the response has been generated after the request was sent.
The second component, μTESLA, provides authenticated broadcast and is a
more energy efficient implementation of TESLA [66], with shorter key-chains,
capped number of senders and use of symmetric encryption in order to fall within
the constraints posed by WSNs. μTESLA is based on hash chains and requires a
loose time synchronization among the nodes. In order to send an authenticated
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packet, the sender generates the authentication code at the current interval using
a secret key. The message is sent and in a following interval the key is disclosed. At
this point a receiver can use a previous key to authenticate the new key, and in case
of a correct match use the new key to authenticate the message. No confidentiality
is implemented so the protocol does not encrypt the messages.
3.5.2 TinySec
TinySec [43] is another energy efficient security protocol, specifically designed
for the data link layer of WSNs. It is integrated into the default implementation
of TinyOS [49], an operating system for WSNs. It provides data authentication
and message confidentiality. TinySec does not include protection against replay
attacks.
Similarly to SNEP, also TinySec uses a single symmetric cipher to perform all
the cryptographic operation. The algorithm used in this case is Skipjack [63] in ci-
pher block chaining (CBC) mode, while CBC-MAC is used for authentication. In
order to avoid cipher-text expansion, a technique called cipher-text stealing (Fig-
ure 3.8) is used.
Plain 1IV Plain 2
Ek
Cipher 1 Cipher 2
Ek
Cipher 3
C3'
Ek
C3'Plain 3
Figure 3.8: Cipher-text stealing prevents cipher-text expansion by rearranging
the blast two blocks.
The protocol supports two modes, authenticated encryption and authentication.
In order to provide IND-CPA, a constantly changing initialization vector (IV)
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composed of a counter and most of the header of a packet, is used for the encryp-
tion mode. The length of the IV is 8 bytes. The authors accept the fact that IVs
will repeat, this is the reason why a block cipher and CBC-MAC were chosen. To
address that they suggest to change the key after enough messages have been pro-
cessed.
3.5.3 MiniSec
MiniSec [54] is based upon TinySec and it uses offset codebook (OCB) mode [47,
69, 70] to reduce the number of encryptions passes over the plain-text in order to
obtain authentication and confidentiality. OCB works by generating a cipher-text
C from the plain-text message M, a key K and a nonce N. The cipher-text is also
used together with the plain-text and the key to generate a tag τ (Figure 3.9). The
reverse process is used to obtain the plain-text and to recompute the tag in order to
validate it. To obtain C, the offset Δ is first calculated by using different parts of N.
The plain-text M is then divided into m blocks, according to the block-size of the
underlying encryption algorithm. Each block is encrypted and xored with Δ. For
each of the blocks Δ is updated by xoring it with a value initially derived from the
zero vector 0. The tag is the τ most significant bits of the encryption of the offset
and the running xor of all the message blocks. Optionally, some associated data
AD can be added to the tag. To do so AD is divided into blocks and each block is
encrypted in a similar way to M. The resulting value Auth is then xored with the
tag.
MiniSec provides unicast replay protection through a counter shared between
the sender and the receiver. The counter is updated each time that a message is re-
ceived and messages with a counter value lower than the current one are discarded.
In order to save energy a technique called last bits optimization is used: instead of
exchanging the whole counter in every packet, only the last x bits are sent. This
allows the receiver to update its counter upon receiving a legitimate message, as
long as the number of consecutive dropped packets is less than 2x.
MiniSec can also provide replay protection in a broadcast scenario. Two meth-
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Figure 3.9: Offset Codebook Mode provides both authentication and encryp-
tion at the same time. It is also possible to include associated data (Auth)
which will be authenticated but not encrypted. [47]
ods are used for this: a sliding-windows approach to defend within a certain vul-
nerability window, and a Bloom filter approach used to defend against attacks within
the window. The former divides time into epochs and make nodes agree upon the
current epoch and uses the epoch number as a nonce. To compensate for net-
work latency, two consecutive epochs are considered and decryption is attempted
twice. This allows an attacker to replay a message within the same epoch and for a
constant portion δ (depending upon network latency and synchronization errors)
into the following one. By setting the sliding-window to the length of one epoch
plus δ, no replay is possible.
A second approach uses a counter and two Bloom filters, one for each of the last
two epochs. The counter is used together with the node id and the epoch num-
ber as the nonce and reset at the beginning of each epoch. Whenever a packet is
received, the receiver checks whether or not it decrypts to meaningful data. If it
does the packet must belong to one of the last two epochs. If the packet is valid,
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the epoch number is used to check whether the packet is already in the Bloom filter
for the corresponding epoch. In case of a hit the packet is considered replayed and
discarded, in case of a miss it is considered genuine and it is accepted and added to
the filter. Because of the nature of Bloom filters and the fact that they can produce
false positive there is the possibility that e genuine packet is deemed replayed and
thus rejected.
Finally thanks to the counter used both in unicast and multicast mode, MiniSec
can provide weak freshness and semantic security.
3.5.4 SenSec
SenSec [50] is a transparent link layer security scheme based upon TinySec. It
provides only one mode with both authentication and encryption. SenSec uses
a partially randomized IV that is 8 bytes long and a modified version of Skipjack
called Skipjack-X. This version uses a technique similar to DES-X [44] where given
an 80-bit key K and two additional 64-bit keys K1 and K2, then the encryption of a
message M is obtained as K2 Skipjack(K;K1M). The key length for Skipjack-
X is increased from 80 to 208 bits. However, it is possible to obtain an attack that
reduces the effective length of the key to 111 bits [48].
SenSec also introduces and uses a modified version of CBC called CBC-X (Fig-
ure 3.10) which provides both authentication and encryption at the same time. A
stealing technique is used in order to avoid data expansion.
Three level of keys are used within the system: global keys, cluster keys and
sensor keys. Each key is pre-generated and pre-loaded.
We have discussed about security in both regular and EH WSNs. However,
the most common solutions in literature do not provide anything specific to, nor
they differentiate between battery and EH powered approaches whatsoever. This
is what we are going to focus on in the next chapter.
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Figure 3.10: Scheme of CBC-X with code stealing [50].
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Never trust a computer you can’t throw out a window.
Steve Wozniak
4
Designing a SecureMACProtocol:
ODMAC
After having introduced security in WSNs and having extensively discussedabout security in the data link layer, we will now turn our attention to a spe-
cific MAC protocol, namely the on-demand medium access control (ODMAC).
ODMAC [24] has been developed specifically to accommodate the needs of
EH-WSNs. Its design and theoretical evaluation work are not a contribution of
this dissertation and belong to the respective authors [24, 25]. In Section 2.2 we
introduced EH-WSNs and discussed how they are fundamentally different from
regular WSNs. Their theoretical infinite lifespan poses unique challenges. Further-
more, EH-WSNs are also characterized by spatial inconsistencies: depending on the
particular source of energy being scavenged it is not uncommon to find completely
different energy situation between different portion of the network, independent
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of their physical correlation. For example imagine a solar-powered EH-WSNs with
nodes laying on either sides of a wall. The nodes might be well in range and able
to communicate, but depending on the time of day one side of the network could
be in the shadows and unable to harvest energy. Depending on the topology and
the application being run, this might impact availability or even disconnect the
network making this a concern of the MAC protocol.
In general, all the challenges found in EH-WSNs, be they unique to this setting
or inherited from regular sensor networks, must be addressed in a different way,
accommodating for the requirements and the characteristics of EH devices.
4.1 ProtocolDescription
The main tool that ODMAC has in order to deal with the aforementioned chal-
lenges, is to allow each node to independently choose its own DC and adjust it
according to different parameters like the harvesting rate of a node or the require-
ments of the application. Thanks to that, a trade-off between power and perfor-
mance can be obtained. For example in case of scarce energy the DC can be de-
creased to give time to the node to harvest more and gather enough to survive a
communication. On the other hand, when energy is abundant the DC can be in-
creased and as a result also the performance of the network will increase: more
packets exchanged will translate to increased throughput and decreased delay.
To achieve this, the protocol relies on the RI paradigm, which not only has
proven to be more energy efficient than its counterpart SI [51], but is also a good
match for DC adaptation. A node running ODMAC has two different DCs one
for exchanging messages and one for sensing purposes. These two DCs are respec-
tively called the beaconing and the sensing duty-cycle.
As the name of the paradigm suggests, the message transmission starts from the
receiver. Whenever a beaconing period elapses and a node r ready to receive data
enters the active state, it will perform a CCA to determine whether or not there
is an ongoing transmission already happening. If the channel is available, r will
transmit a beacon b manifesting its intentions to receive a packet and it will then
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start to listen to the channel for incoming packets for a fixed amount of time.
Similarly when a sender s enters the active state because a sensing event has oc-
curred, it will start listening to the channel for an appropriate beacon. This is a bea-
con that satisfies specific predefined conditions such as moving the packet closer
to its destination. Should such a beacon be received s will immediately transmit
its packet and go into sleep mode. In the upcoming wake-ups, s waits for a new
beacon from r which will work as an ACK for the packet sent previously.
Whenever data is received by a node, if the node itself is not the final recip-
ient (as it will happen most of the times in a multi-hop network), a forwarding
procedure will begin. This is identical to the sensing and transmission operation
described above, with the exception that instead of being generated locally, data is
obtained from another node.
A more “implementation oriented” summary of ODMAC can be seen in Fig-
ure 4.1 which describes the protocol as a finite state machine.
sleepstart
wait beacon
wait data
sense
transmit
beacon
no data
forward
Figure 4.1: ODMAC described as a finite state machine.
Being ODMAC specifically designed for EH-WSNs, the guiding principle is al-
most always sustainability, more specifically a node adapts is DCs to remain oper-
ational with the current energy situation, aiming to achieve what we introduced
before as ENO state. The way this is obtained is through a feedback loop where a
node is able to monitor its current energy level and initiate a communication when
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the value is high enough.
4.1.1 Opportunistic Forwarding
One of the features of ODMAC is opportunistic forwarding. The purpose of this is
twofold, it tries to relieve the hub nodes from some of the high traffic that they
would normally experience, and it helps to increase the overall performance of
each link.
Assuming a network with fixed topology, the result of running a networking
protocol will be a (locally distributed) list of routes which tell each node to which
neighbor to send a packet to, based on its final destination. If we consider the pecu-
liar traffic pattern of a WSN, we already know that most of the packets move from
the nodes towards the sink. This means that, except for node failures, the routes
will be static and the minority of nodes that have been highly rated by the routing
protocol will experience most of the traffic and therefore they will consume more
energy on average. This has a negative impact on the network, especially consider-
ing that within ODMAC when a node consumes more energy it will decrease its
DC and slow down the beacon transmission rate.
In order to address this problem, opportunistic forwarding allows each node
to transmit to a set of receivers that allow the packet to move closer to its final
destination, even if the route used is sub-optimal. The way a receiver is selected is
on a first come first served basis, the first beacon received that originates from a node
in the set, is answered to by the sender.
From the receiver standpoint the traffic will be distributed more evenly across all
the possible receivers and high-energy nodes will be automatically selected thanks
to their increased beaconing rate. The sender will also obtain benefits in the form
of a reduced idle listening time. In order to receive a beacon the radio of the sender
must be turned on in listening mode. The longer the radio is used, the more energy
is consumed. By answering to the first appropriate beacon, a sender will decrease
this period of time, thus saving energy.
Furthermore, by opportunistically selecting beacons, the average amount of time
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that a packet spends waiting to be relayed to the next hop is also decreased. This
means that the overall delay of the network is decreased, a factor that mitigates the
use of what could be sub-optimal paths.
4.1.2 Altruistic Backoff
Another feature of ODMACs is altruistic backoff (AB), a collision avoidance tech-
nique. Collisions are physiological in MAC protocols and ODMAC is not differ-
ent. Whenever two nodes that want to transmit to the same receiver are awake at
the same time and obtain a beacon from said receiver, a collision is highly likely to
happen. Both nodes will try to use the beacon and occupy the channel at the same
time. The most commonly used technique to deal with collision is random back-
off (RB), where each node chooses a random value before transmitting and “backs
off ” for that amount of time before performing the actual transmission, which then
takes place only if the channel is available after the delay.
In a RI protocol in general, and within ODMAC in particular, RB is costly be-
cause it prevents the collisions at the latest possible moment, when everything but
the actual transmission already happened, including waiting for and receiving a
beacon. The idea behind AB is for a node to give way to other nodes waiting for
the same beacon. This is done through an altruistic backoff request (ABR) packet.
When transmitted by a sender s, the goal of this packet is to inform other potential
senders about what kind of receivers s is waiting for. If any other node is waiting
for beacons from the same receiver, they will backoff leaving the channel to s.
The procedure is repeated by each node when it wakes up so that the last node
issuing an ABR is the one obtaining the channel.
Contrarily to RB, the ABR transmission is done as soon as a sender wakes up
and before a beacon is sent and received. As soon as a node receives an ABR for a
common receiver it goes immediately back into power saving mode, allowing for
additional energy saving.
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4.1.3 Layer-based Anycast Routing
One more feature that can be found in ODMAC is layer-based anycast routing
(LAR). Strictly speaking this is a routing extension rather than a link layer func-
tionality, and it shows how ODMAC is supporting a cross-layer approach.
LAR has two phases, a set-up phase and a steady phase. During set-up each node
is assigned a layer value, which is the smallest number of hops between itself and
the sink node. The value of each layer is calculated through a distributed breadth
first search (BFS) rooted at the sink, where each node sets as its own layer the
value received by neighboring nodes, incremented by one, provided that it is less
than the current calculated value. Each node will then transmit its layer for the
information to propagate.
During the steady phase, each node considers appropriate the beacons with a
layer value less than its own (also the value equal to the layer of the node are ac-
cepted if intra-layer routing is allowed) and uses them to relay messages. If after
a predefined period of time a node does not receive any appropriate beacon, the
layer number is reset and re-initialized according to the value of the beacons re-
ceived. A similar approach is used by nodes deployed at a later time to join the
network when is already operational or to reorganize it in the case of failures. This
functionality copes very well with opportunistic forwarding.
4.2 Security ofODMAC
So far we have been discussing about the importance of the data link layer and the
MAC protocols, even described some security suites for them and introduced a
new protocol specific for EH-WSN, namely ODMAC. The natural question that
arises now is: “How secure is ODMAC?”. This is what we will address now.
Given the current state of the protocol and according to what has been intro-
duced so far, the answer is: “Not very”, let us discuss the potential weaknesses of
ODMAC.
Based on the definition of security that we gave in Chapter 3, the minimum
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properties that we would like to have are: confidentiality, integrity and availability.
So far ODMAC does not provide any of this. Messages are sent in the clear and
there is no control over their authenticity, allowing an attacker to eavesdrop the
communication, intercept messages and forge new ones. This would make pretty
much all the attacks presented in Section 3.2 possible.
To address this, we developed a security suite inspired by TinySec [43]. The se-
curity suite has four modes of operation: no security, authentication, encryption and
authentication+encryption which can be chosen on a per-message basis, allowing
for full customization from the user. When both authentication and encryption
are chosen, they are composed using the secure encrypt-than-MAC paradigm [46].
The scheme supports encryption algorithms with 64-bit blocks and 80-bit or
128-bit keys. In our proof of concept implementation we have used Skipjack [63]
which requires 20B of RAM and around 6:5KiB of ROM. Despite its age, Skipjack
continues to prove secure for an 80-bit key algorithm [45], the most successful at-
tack so far is an impossible differential attack on 31 of the 32 rounds yielding a
result marginally faster than exhaustive search [6]. Considering that the national
institute for standards and technology (NIST) has proposed to phase out the use
of 80-bit keys by 2015, it is a good idea to turn the attention to algorithms support-
ing 128 bits keys. Depending on the application and the implementation, differ-
ent ciphers can be used [48]. Piccolo [75] and TWINE [78] are good candidates
for software implementations respectively requiring 91 B and 23 B of RAM and
2:5 KiB and 2:2 KiB of ROM. For hardware implementation the best candidate is
PRESENT [8] which uses 1886 gate equivalent (GE) and has also been included
in the standard for lightweight cryptographic methods by the international orga-
nization for standardization (ISO) [30].
Encryption is carried out using CBC mode with cipher-text stealing to avoid
last block message expansion, while authentication is done with CBC-MAC. This
allows to use one encryption algorithm to perform both operations. It is important
to highlight that a key for the system in authentication+encryption mode is actually
a pair of keys, one for each operation. Authentication codes and encryption are
checked and re-computed at each hop. This has the advantage of intercepting ma-
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liciously or fortuitously malformed packets as early as possible, avoiding to waste
energy to route them to their final destination only to discard them there.
A possible extension to the scheme is to use an authenticated encryption (AE)
mode. The advantage of this technique is that it is possible to obtain both authenti-
cation and encryption at the same time, without having to run the algorithm twice.
The highest performance algorithms are OCB (used in MiniSec [54]) and Galois
counter mode (GCM), with the former having the better performance [47]. Un-
fortunately OCB is patented and could not be used freely until recently (9th Jan-
uary 2013), when a free license has been issued for open-source non-commercial
application. The algorithm is still not free for commercial applications. The other
mode, GCM, is notoriously cumbersome to implement correctly. A comparison
between different implementations in TinySec can be found in [41] where CBC
and GCM are analyzed in conjunction with both the advanced encryption stan-
dard (AES) and Skipjack. The results show that GCM in combination with AES
obtains a 12% increase in energy consumption, a 28% increase in RAM usage and
a 35% decrease in throughput compared to the original implementation of Tiny-
Sec. While constantly outperforming CBC in combination with AES, it is still a
considerable decrease in performance, justifiable only if the application requires
both authentication and encryption without any differentiation.
Thanks to the addition of our scheme, ODMAC achieves much better security
properties while still maintaining a low-resource profile and remaining suitable for
EH-WSNs.
One final component included in ODMAC is the receiver authentication pro-
tocol (RAP), a protocol specifically designed to prevent a new attack that we call
beacon replay attack. We will introduce and discuss this in Chapter 5.
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The trouble with quotes on the Internet is that you never know
if they are genuine.
Abraham Lincoln
5
Beacon Replay Attack
In Section 3.2, we have introduced several well-known attacks, mostly for regular
WSNs. However, we have reiterated many times how EH-WSNs follow different
rules and require different solutions. With respect to the link layer, we believe,
these solutions are strongly connected to RI protocols and that ODMAC is a good
candidate to serve as a customizable platform that can be tweaked according to the
application requirements. In our working with these protocols, we have discovered
that ODMAC and RI protocols in general are susceptible to a powerful attack, the
beacon replay attack.
5.1 Classic Replay Attack and Protection
As presented before, the replay attack [15] is a well-known attack where a pre-
viously sent piece of information is recorded and re-transmitted at a later time,
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unmodified. In WSNs this constitutes a significant threat since replay attacks are
very commonly used as an essential building block for more complex and effective
attacks such as sinkhole and blackhole attacks [42].
For example a more involved attack that can be mounted by replaying mes-
sages is path denial of service (PDoS) [14]. This is an attack where a whole path
from one sensor node to the BS is filled with bogus packets. Given that a WSN
is typically structured as a tree rooted at the BS, not only the node at one end of
the attacked path can not use the communication medium, but also all the nodes
along the path are prevented from forwarding their own messages. Furthermore,
depending on the specific application that is being run on top of the network, re-
played data messages could pose different kind of threats according to their specific
meaning.
Other previous works have addressed and mitigated replay attacks. The most
common solution is to make each packet unique by means of adding either a counter
or a timestamp. Timestamps are usually harder to implement because they require
an agreement between the sender and the receiver which, in turns, translates to a
global agreement for forwarded packets. This is an expensive property to achieve,
and depending on the protocol might even be discouraged. For example the goal
of ODMAC is to allow each node to independently regulate its own DC. An alter-
native is represented by monotonically increasing counters that are generally fed
to a cryptographic message authentication code (CMAC), making sure that each
message is unique.
5.1.1 Beacon Replay Attack in the Receiver-Initiated Paradigm
The beacon replay attack can be mounted by capturing and replaying beacon pack-
ets. This might sound like a pedantic redefinition, but as we will show it constitutes
a different kind of attack in and of itself. We know that beacons manifest the avail-
ability of a particular node to receive a message. Among other optional control
values, they contain the identity of their creator which is the main piece of infor-
mation needed to determine whether or not a specific beacon can be used by a
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potential sender, and who to send the packet to. By replaying beacons contain-
ing good identities (typically from a routing point of view), it is possible to obtain
several harmful effects and mount other attacks.
First of all, an attacker could flood the channel with these frames, pretending to
be an extremely active receiver and trying to accumulate as many data packets as
possible. By definition this is a sinkhole attack. After the acquisition, packets can
be completely dropped thus performing a blackhole attack. A subtler possibility is
to implement a selective forwarding attack, where packets are not dropped indis-
criminately, but rather according to their source. This yields a harder to detect and
yet still very effective attack.
By replaying beacons containing different identities to the same sender nodes,
it is possible to have a sybil attack. This could lead to routing paths to become
invalid, or even nodes that are physically not within range one another, to be led
to believe so; turning this into a rudimentary one-man wormhole attack.
One last meta-attack, specific to duty-cycling wireless networks, is what we call
the sleepwalker attack. The idea behind it is that if the legitimate owner of a beacon
receives a message with its own identity, it can easily detect that there is an ongoing
attack and warn the rest of the network. However, all the previous attacks can be
deployed by a malicious node that is within range of the attacked node simply by
exploiting the notion of DC. Beacons can be collected from a node and replayed in
the same neighborhood when the original sender is asleep. In this way a malicious
node can effectively masquerade itself as another node.
An additional problem with the beacon replay attack is that the techniques that
we briefly introduced before and that are normally used to counter regular replay
attacks do not apply in this scenario. One of the advantages of an RI approach is the
fact that no synchronization is needed for the protocol to operate. Timestamps, in
order to be meaningful, require some form of clock synchronization among the
nodes. This usually comes for free within protocols that use synchronized DCs,
but is a costly feature to obtain in RI protocols.
The other common alternative is the use of counters and session numbers. The
latter are random non-reusable numbers that uniquely identify a particular mes-
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sage, or in this case a beacon. In order to check if a received beacon is fresh or
replayed, a table of all the previously used session numbers should be kept. Given
the highly constrained resources of a sensor node, and the fact that there should
be such a table for each one of the neighboring nodes, this solution is inapplica-
ble. One way of simplifying this mechanism is to replace the random number with
a monotonically increasing counter. This eliminates the need of having to store
a whole table, only the latest value is needed. Upon receiving a message the new
counter value can be compared against the last received one and if newer (i.e., the
received value of the counter is bigger than the previous one) it will be accepted
and discarded otherwise. The reason why this mechanism does not work with an
RI protocol is the following. Beacons are sent with a periodic cadence, which is
typically randomized in order to minimize collisions. If we also consider all the
neighboring nodes, from the point of view of a specific node, the arrival time of
a beacon is virtually uniformly distributed. This means that there is no way for
a sleeping node to know how many beacons were sent between the current and
the previous active period, allowing the attacker to replay beacons that were not
received by sleeping nodes.
Moreover, a downside of both timestamps and counters, is that some extra in-
formation has to be sent with every beacon, even the ones that will never be re-
ceived, because all the other nodes are asleep. This constitutes a costly overhead.
Lastly, despite the fact that CMACs can be used to authenticate beacons, they
cannot prevent a replay attack. All that can be guaranteed upon receiving a beacon
whose authentication tag correctly matches, is that the at some moment in time
that beacon was genuine, created by a legitimate node and intended for another
legitimate node. However, it is not possible to establish whether or not the beacon
that has just been received is actually that beacon.
For all these reasons, we have designed RAP, a novel authentication scheme
specifically designed to detect and prevent the beacon replay attack in receiver-
initiated MAC protocols.
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5.2 Receiver Authentication Protocol (RAP)
RAP is a challenge-response authentication protocol that aims to authenticate re-
ceivers, i.e., the beacon transmitter, in an RI data transmission, securing the com-
munication in general. RAP is compatible with and can be used on top of every
MAC protocol that follows the RI paradigm, essentially securing the whole class
of protocols from beacon replay attacks. Moreover, RAP can and should be used
together with security suites that provide other security features such as data in-
tegrity and confidentiality.
Sender Receiver
Beaconi
Dataj
Beaconi+1,Ack(D
ataj)
(a)
Sender Receiver
Beaconi
Dataj,CD
Beaconi+1,Ack(D
ataj),E(CD)
(b)
Sender Receiver
Beaconi
CP
E(CP)
Dataj
Beaconi+1,Ack(D
ataj)
CP≟ D(E(CP))
(c)
Figure 5.1: A typical receiver-initiated protocol (a), RAP-D (b), RAP-P (c).
RAP has two modes of operation as shown in Figure 5.1, namely detection and
preventionmode. In a nutshell, the receiver authentication protocol detection mode
(RAP-D) is a low overhead scheme that aims at detecting an intruder that replays
beacons without stopping it from doing so. The receiver authentication protocol
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prevention mode (RAP-P), on the other hand, is a more costly scheme that stops
the attack altogether. As described in the following sections, the key difference be-
tween the two modes is the timing of the challenge-response message exchange.
In RAP-P, the challenge phase takes place before the data transmission. Thus, the
sender transmits the data packet only if the receiver is authenticated. The low over-
head nature of RAP-D, on the other hand, is maintained by piggybacking the chal-
lenge and its response on top of the frames normally exchanged in the MAC pro-
tocol. In other words, the authentication of the receiver takes place after the data
transmission (thus, the attack is not immediately prevented). Having energy ef-
ficiency as a primary system priority, the idea is that a node normally operates at
the low overhead detection mode and switches to the expensive prevention mode
only if necessary.
5.2.1 Detection Mode (RAP-D)
RAP-D is aiming at detecting beacon replay attacks with low communication over-
head. The protocol works as shown in Figure 5.1b. Consider that a sender node S
wants to transmit some data to a receiver node R. After R broadcasts a beacon, S
answers back with a data packet and a challenge valueCD. On its following beacon,
R acknowledges the reception of the data packet, and attaches the encrypted ver-
sion of the challengeEkRAP(CD) using the protocol specific, shared key kRAP. At this
point R can validate the response to the challenge by decrypting and checking it
against its original value. Should these two values not match, then R can conclude
that the initial beacon was not genuine.
RAP-D adds a minimal overhead in the whole communication scheme, as the
challenge and the response are piggybacked on top of a regular message exchange.
Furthermore, if the challengeCD is transmitted as part of the payload and encrypted
with it, its size can be relatively small without risking of increasing the chances of
success of a space exhaustion attack (see Section 5.3.2).
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5.2.2 Prevention Mode (RAP-P)
RAP-P is aiming to prevent the beacon replay attack at the cost of an increased
overhead. In particular, the challenge-response messages are exchanged before the
data transmission, in order to distinguish the legitimate from the replayed beacons.
The protocol works as shown in Figure 5.1c. Instead of sending the data right af-
ter a beacon, S sends out a longer challenge CP, and awaits for its encrypted ver-
sion EkRAP(CP) from R. Only if the received value decrypts correctly (i.e., matches
against CP), then the data are sent. This scheme is more expensive because it re-
quires two additional messages to be exchanged. Additionally, the size of the chal-
lenge needs to be significantly larger than the detection mode to prevent space
exhaustion attacks.
5.2.3 Transition Policies
Depending on the security goal of an application, RAP can be configured to switch
between the two modes, using several policies. If the application cannot tolerate
a few beacons getting replayed, the protocol should always operate in prevention
mode for maximum security. In the opposite case, the detection mode should be
the default to promote energy efficiency. Here, the transition from RAP-D to RAP-
P should be done after a defined number of challenge mismatches. This number
should be configured accordingly to account for channel errors. Furthermore, the
intruder detection may trigger an alarm that can be piggybacked onto data packets
and beacons in order to warn the neighboring nodes and the sink of an ongoing
attack. The transition back to detection mode can be done either automatically
or manually depending on the desired level of security. In cases of high security
requirements, it may be desired that RAP-D is re-activated manually by the system
administrator only after an investigation. An automatic transition to RAP-D, can
be done after a predetermined number of successful challenge matches. To avoid
the exploitation of this transition policy, the threshold value can be exponentially
increased each time a new replay attack is detected.
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5.3 Verification and Analysis
5.3.1 Verification with OFMC and ProVerif
In order to formally verify RAP, we modeled it using the Alice and Bob (AnB) lan-
guage. AnB [59] is a specification language based on the popular Alice-and-Bob
notation for security protocols. Besides giving us a way to describe the protocols
of interest in a succinct way, AnB is also a formal language with an unambiguous
semantics of the honest agents, the intruder, and the goals of the protocol. The se-
mantics of AnB is defined by translation to infinite-state transition systems and its
attack states, described in the AVISPA intermediate format (IF) [2]. The IF can be
directly read by several tools, such as on-the-fly model checker (OFMC) [4]. We
also manually translate AnB specification to the abstraction-based tool ProVerif [7].
The main idea for using two tools lies in their complementary strengths. OFMC
is effective in finding attacks, but can verify a protocol only for a bounded num-
ber sessions; on the other hand ProVerif abstracts from the concrete search space,
sometimes producing false attacks (especially for replay-protection goals), requir-
ing adaptations of the specification. Therefore, verifying the protocols with differ-
ent approaches gives a higher confidence.
The core of the AnB specification is the definition of the behavior of each role of
the protocol when it is played by an honest agent, namely how this agent decom-
poses the messages it receives (and what parts of a received message it can actually
check), and how the agent composes outgoing messages based on its initial Knowl-
edge and the previously received messages. Here, all variables that do not appear
in the knowledge section of the AnB specification are values that arefreshly created
by the agent who first uses them. For instance in the detection protocol RAP-D, S
freshly creates the challenge C and the data Data. For the full details of the AnB
semantics we refer to the original paper [59].
The standard intruder model of AnB is the common Dolev-Yao intruder [21]
who controls the entire communication medium, it can arbitrarily overhear, send
and even intercept messages. This is clearly inspired by communication in wired
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networks. We have argued before that for WSNs this model is fitting for some
aspects, but unrealistically strong for others: an intruder may not control all lo-
cations spanned by the WSN and also it may not be able to hear a message when
it is blocking it (e.g., by jamming). However, verifying the protocol under such a
strong intruder gives higher confidence in this particular scenario.
Moreover, unless explicitly excluded in the specification, the intruder can also
play as a legal participant of the protocol. In the case of WSNs, this amounts to
modeling compromised or intruder-controlled nodes. These dishonest nodes do
not need to comply with the protocol, but can send whatever messages the intruder
can compose from its knowledge. The initial intruder knowledge is determined
also by the knowledge section of the AnB specification: for each instance of a role
that the intruder is playing, he gets the associated initial knowledge. For example,
consider in the RAP-D protocol a session where S is played by honest agent a and
R is played by the intruder i. Then the intruder gets the knowledge of R under
this instantiation, i.e., a; i;mac; sk(a; i), and thus he has the shared key needed for
communicating with a.
Furthermore, we use authentication goals which correspond to injective agree-
ment ad introduced by Lowe [52]. For the concrete example of the goal S authen-
ticates R on R;C used in raps, as soon as R learns the fresh challenge C, it produces
(in our model) an auxiliary event witness(R; S;C) formalizing the intention to run
the protocol with S and to use C. When S successfully finishes her run of the pro-
tocol, she produces also an event request(S;R;C) to formalize that she finished the
protocol, apparently with R and using challenge C. It counts as an attack if a trace
contains more request events than corresponding witness events, i.e., when S ei-
ther believes in receiving something from R that R actually has never sent, or if S is
tricked into accepting something more times than R actually sent.
Finally, we use the channel notation introduced by Maurer [57], which is sup-
ported by the AnB language (for the formal definitions in AnB see [61]). Infor-
mally A !B means that A sends a message authentically to B (so B can be sure it
really comes from A and was meant for B), A!B means that the message is sent
confidentially (so A can be sure only B can receive it), and A !B means both
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authentic and confidential transmission. We use this notation to abstract from how
the transmission of the actual data is organized, i.e., how authentication and con-
fidentiality is achieved if they are desired. In fact, this problem is orthogonal to
the replay-protection for the beacon that we study here, and the channel notation
allows us to abstract from that. We note however that the actual realization of such
channels (e.g., by CMAC and/or encryption) needs to compose with our replay-
protection, as explained in [61]. In short, if both our replay protection and the
secure channel implementation use symmetric encryption with the same shared
key, this can lead to misunderstandings in the WSN that may be exploitable. If
they use however different keys (possibly derived from the same root key) this is
prevented and the composition is sound.
Pro to co l : B a s i c A u t h
Types :
A g e n t S , R ;
F u n c t i o n mac , s k
Knowledge :
S : S , R , mac , s k ( S , R) ;
R : S , R , mac , s k ( S , R)
Ac t i on s :
R >S : R , mac ( s k ( S , R) , R)
S * >*R : D a t a
Goals :
S a u t h e n t i c a t e s R on R
(a)
Pro to co l : RAP D
Types :
A g e n t S , R ;
F u n c t i o n s k
Knowledge :
S : S , R , s k ( S , R) ;
R : S , R , s k ( S , R)
Ac t i on s :
R >S : R
S * >*R : D a t a , C
R >S : { | C | } s k ( S , R)
Goals :
S a u t h e n t i c a t e s R on R , C
(b)
Pro to co l : RAP P
Types :
A g e n t S , R ;
F u n c t i o n s k
Knowledge :
S : S , R , s k ( S , R) ;
R : S , R , s k ( S , R)
Ac t i on s :
R >S : R
S >R : C
R >S : { | C | } s k ( S , R)
S * >*R : D a t a
Goals :
S a u t h e n t i c a t e s R on R , C
(c)
Figure 5.2: The protocols used with OFMC described in AnB notation. A ba-
sic authentication model (a) is only enough to prevent beacon forgery. RAP-D
(b) and RAP-P (c) are not affected by beacon replay attacks.
In Figure 5.2 it is possible to see how we modeled RAP using the AnB nota-
tion [59]. It should be noted that we decided to strip down the protocols in order
to focus the attention on the beacon replay attack, hence we kept only the mes-
sages relevant in this sense. Furthermore, we also decided not to include the basic
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version of the paradigm which does not include any form of authentication. This
protocol is essentially modeled like the basic version (Figure 5.2a) but without a
CMAC for the beacon. This yields the trivial attack of beacon forgery due to the
complete lack of authentication.
In the case of basic authentication (Figure 5.2a), OFMC can detect the beacon
replay attack, shown in Figure 5.3, within a few seconds. For the intruder i it is
simply enough to store a previously received beacon and replay it to a victim node
in order to receive the data. Another interesting fact is that by adding the weakly
clause to the authentication goal, hence turning it into Lowe non-injective agree-
ment [52], no attack is found. This helps to build confidence in the model and its
correctness.
(r; 1) intruder (s; 1)
 r;mac(sk(s;r);r) //  r;mac(sk(s;r);r) // 
 
data1
oo (s; 2)
 r;mac(sk(s;r);r) // 
 
data2
oo
Figure 5.3: Trace of the beacon replay attack found by OFMC in the basic
version of a receiver-initiated protocol. The intruder intercepts the beacon
and forwards it to the sender (s) completing a session. subsequently, in a new
session, the same beacon and its associated CMAC are replayed, obtaining
new data.
When running OFMC on RAP-D and RAP-P, we can verify them for three ses-
sions , without any attack. Note that in each session, OFMC considers all possi-
ble instantiations of the roles with concrete agents, both honest and the intruder.
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Thus, whenever a protocol is verified for a given number of sessions, then there is
no instantiation of the roles for these parallel sessions that can lead to an attack. As
a rule of thumb, attacks are usually detected within two sessions.
ProVerif computes on first-order Horn clauses [35] that represent an over-ap-
proximation of the reachable events and messages the intruder can ever learn. There
is therefore no notion of time-line, posing some difficulties for the analysis of re-
play, even though ProVerif offers the notion of injective events for this purpose. In
order to experiment with different settings, we used the AIF framework [60] built
on top of ProVerif, allowing to specify a state-transition system with a number of
sets of data. In this particular case we can define for each agent the set of challenges
that are sent out and have not been responded to, as well as those that have been
responded to (and are therefore used). The AIF framework also allows for produc-
ing the Horn clauses for a different tool (on which ProVerif was originally based):
the automatic first-order theorem prover SPASS [85]. It is therefore without extra
cost to check the verification also with SPASS. Both tools successfully verify the
protocols.
5.3.2 Space Exhaustion Analysis
In this section we conduct a space exhaustion analysis on RAP. Specifically, an at-
tacker can passively monitor the communication of legitimate nodes and collect
pairs of challenge and response messages. In this way, the attacker can gradually
build a dictionary that can be used to bypass RAP. The size of such a dictionary is
a direct indication of the resilience of the protocol against space exhaustion.
When RAP is in prevention mode, an attacker can trivially map the challenge
to the respective response, as they are both distinct messages. Thus, the size of
each word DRAP-P in the dictionary is equal to the size CP of the challenge in bits,
translating to 2DRAP-P words.
DRAP-P = CP (5.1)
When RAP is in detection mode, we aim at a small challenge to keep the overhead
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low. However, the dictionary size can be significantly increased by encrypting the
challenge together with the data, using CBC mode. Essentially, CBC hides the
challenge within the data, preventing the attacker from mapping it to the response.
As a result, a dictionary can only be built by mapping the whole message (that
contains both the data and the challenge) to the respective response. Therefore,
the size of each word DRAP-D in the dictionary, which translates to a dictionary
size of 2DRAP-D words, is equal to the aggregate size LD of the data and CD of the
challenge.
DRAP-D = CD + LD (5.2)
As an attacker can force the system to change the mode of operation, we note
that the overall resilience of RAP to space exhaustion is equal to the smallest of the
two dictionaries, DRAP-D andDRAP-P. Furthermore, the sizes of the two challenges,
CD and CP, which constitute configurable protocol parameters, define the level of
security in the same manner the size of a key defines the level of security of an
encryption algorithm.
5.3.3 Energy Consumption Analysis
In this section, we attempt to model the energy overhead of RAP and highlight the
trade off between security and energy constraints.
Let LD be the size of a data packet in bits, LB be the size of a beacon in bits and λ
the transmission rate of the radio in bits per second. Additionally, letPtx andPrx be
power consumption for transmitting and receiving / listening respectively. First,
we estimate the energy consumption for a single packet transmission in the case of
not using RAP. For the receiver, R, the energy consumption is estimated by (5.3),
where tG is a time guard during which the radio is turned on while waiting for a
answer right after a transmission. The purpose of such a guard is to account for the
propagation and the processing delay.
EDefaultR =
LB
λ
Ptx + tGPrx +
LD
λ
Prx +
LB
λ
Ptx (5.3)
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For the sender, S, the energy consumption is estimated similarly.
EDefaultS =
LB
λ
Prx +
LD
λ
Ptx + tGPrx +
LB
λ
Prx (5.4)
Note that this energy model disregards the energy consumed while the sender
awaits for the beacon, as this source of energy consumption is independent of the
security protocol.
In the case of RAP-D, the energy consumption for a single packet transmission,
for the receiver (R) and the sender (S), is given by the following formulae.
ERAP-DR =
LB
λ
Ptx + tGPrx +
LD + CD
λ
Prx +
LB + CD
λ
Ptx (5.5)
ERAP-DS =
LB
λ
Prx +
LD + CD
λ
Ptx + tGPrx +
LB + CD
λ
Prx (5.6)
In the case of RAP-P, the energy consumption for a single packet transmission,
for the receiver (R) and the sender (S), is estimated similarly.
ERAP-PR =
LB
λ
Ptx + tGPrx +
CD
λ
Prx +
CD
λ
Ptx + tGPrx +
LD
λ
Prx +
LB
λ
Ptx (5.7)
ERAP-PS =
LB
λ
Prx +
CD
λ
Ptx + tGPrx +
CD
λ
Prx +
LD
λ
Ptx + tGPrx +
LB
λ
Prx (5.8)
We define the energy consumption overhead (ECO) of a protocol as the ratio of
the energy consumption for a single packet transmission (while using the respec-
tive protocol) over the case of a plain communication (without using it). The sub-
script j is equivalent to R for the receiver and S for the sender.
ECORAP-Dj =
ERAP-Dj
EDefaultj
, ECORAP-Pj =
ERAP-Pj
EDefaultj
(5.9)
For the following numerical results, we assume using the CC2500 radio [39]
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Figure 5.4: Energy consumption overhead for a single packet transmission for
RAP-D (a) and RAP-P (b).
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which has the following characteristics: λ = 500 kbps, Ptx = 53:8 mW, Prx =
42:5 mW. Additionally, we consider the following values for the protocol parame-
ters: LB = 2 B, LD = 32 B and tG = 10 μs.
Figure 5.4 shows the cost for a single packet transmission of the two protocols,
as defined in Equation (5.9). Notice that the cost of the sender and the receiver
increases linearly with the challenge size while the cost for the latter is relatively
higher. The difference between them also increases as the challenge size increases.
In Figure 5.5, we compare the cost of RAP-D and RAP-P, showing the low-
overhead nature of the former. Particularly, we compare the cost overhead ECOR
for the receiver of the two protocols keeping the same dictionary word size D,
as defined in Equations (5.1) and (5.2). Note that the dictionary word size in-
dicates the resilience of each protocol to space exhaustion. In the case of RAP-
D, we make sure the value of the challenge is at least 1 B by setting it to CD =
max (DRAP-D   LD; 1). As shown in the figure, the cost of using RAP-P is signifi-
cantly higher than the cost of using RAP-D for the same level of security.
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Figure 5.5: The relative cost between RAP-D and RAP-P for the same level
of resilience to space exhaustion.
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Figure 5.6 investigates the relative cost of the two protocols for different data
sizes, by comparing the cost overhead ECOR for the receiver of the two protocols.
Additionally, we consider different dictionary word sizes as requirements for re-
silience to space exhaustion. The results suggest that increasing the data packet
drops the energy cost down for both protocols. The energy overhead of RAP-D
can be kept at a minimal level as long as the data size is above the dictionary word
size requirement.
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Figure 5.6: The relative cost between RAP-D and RAP-P for different data
sizes (LD) and required levels of resilience to space exhaustion (D).
To conclude on this topic, we focused on securing the class of RI MAC pro-
tocols for WSNs against the beacon replay attack. According to the RI paradigm
of communication, beacons are used to initiate the communication between two
nodes. By collecting and replaying such beacons, an intruder can pretend a fake
identity and perform a series of attacks. In particular, we proposed a challenge-
response authentication protocol, named RAP, that is able to detect and prevent
beacon replay attacks. RAP has two modes of operation. RAP-D is a low-overhead
protocol that is able to detect intruders who replay beacons. RAP-P, on the other
hand, is a more expensive prevention mechanism. We validated the effectiveness
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of RAP against beacon replay attacks using various tools, including OFMC and
ProVerif. Furthermore, we have modeled the energy consumption of both pro-
tocols and exposed the trade-off between the level of security, measured by the
resilience of the scheme to space exhaustion, and the level of energy consump-
tion. Finally, we have shown that the energy consumption of RAP-P is significantly
higher than RAP-D, but so are its security guarantees.
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Several years ago Microsoft made a big deal about Win-
dows NT getting a C2 security rating. They were much less
forthcoming with the fact that this rating only applied if the
computer was not attached to a network and had no network
card, had its floppy drive epoxied shut, and was running on a
Compaq 386. Solaris’s C2 rating was just as silly.
Bruce Schneier
6
Adaptive Security
In the previous chapters we have discussed about how we can design protocolsthat support EH-WSNs. In this chapter we will focus on how it is possible to
take direct advantage of different varying levels of energy by providing adaptive
security.
The building block of security mechanisms for WSNs are encryption schemes.
Independent of the specific application, what normally happens is that the data
channel is made confidential and/or authentic through the use of encryption schemes
and related modes of operation, as we discussed in the previous chapters. The typ-
ical family of algorithms used with sensor nodes are symmetric encryption algo-
rithms since they are considerably less expensive in terms of energy requirements
when compared to public key encryption schemes [83]. Different algorithms have
different energetic requirements and while some of these are connected to how
good and optimized the actual implementation is, a considerable portion is intrin-
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sic to the specific algorithm. It is logic to expect that a block cipher with a block-size
of 128 bits will require more CPU cycles than an algorithm with a block-size of 64
bits in order to perform similar operations. A similar point can be made for the key-
size of an algorithm, a longer key is bound to produce higher energy requirements,
despite the fact that it should also increase the complexity of the cryptanalysis and
the robustness of the cipher-text.
For this reason, when energy is a big concern, having to commit to a specific al-
gorithm is going to be a sub-optimal decision. In an EH scenario, a specific scheme
can be inadequate in different ways: for example it could be too expensive in terms
of energy and cause the whole system to delay sending new messages until enough
energy has been gathered. Within a network with heterogeneous messages, a given
scheme could not meet the security requirements for a particular type of message,
while it could be more than enough for a different type.
In order to address this issue we now discuss and propose an adaptive scheme
that allows each node to autonomously and independently choose the most suit-
able algorithm to use for a given link of the network and for a given energy config-
uration.
6.1 RelatedWork
Adaptive security is not a brand new concept. The work in [79] uses a similar
environment and a similar approach, additionally focusing on priority, but limited
to single-hop networks with carrier sense multiple access (CSMA). The authors
say that rather than achieving an absolute decrease in energy consumption, they
manage to obtain a trade-off among consumed energy, importance of the packets
sent and their security.
Another example of adaptive security can be found in [80]. Here optical wire-
less communications are taken into account. The authors propose to subdivide
an encryption system S into n subsystems S1; S2; S3; : : : ; Sn each one representing
one encryption parameter such as key size, number of rounds or operation mode.
The idea then is to vary those parameters according to the security requirements
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or the amount of available energy in the case of battery powered devices.
The work in [31] is closer to static analysis. Three main parameters are used to
define the security level of a protocol: the protection level, the probability of an
attack and the impact of a successful attack. Concerning the protection level, pa-
rameters such as the efficacy of an attack (provided it is successful), the knowledge
required to mount it, its cost, the communication overhead and the complexity of
the implementation are considered. Similarly, the impact of a successful attack is
calculated according to the financial losses during the attack, the cost for recov-
ering from the attack and the losses in reputation suffered by the owners of the
system. Finally, the probability of an attack is assumed to be given. These value
are composed to obtain a single security level. Individual security mechanism are
then analyzed and defined in terms of complexity and power consumption. Ul-
timately, according to the system specifications, the required security capabilities
and the provided cost functions, specific security parameters are chosen and the
system is run accordingly.
6.2 ProtocolDescription
We will now introduce and describe the inner working of our scheme on adaptive
security. The scheme is extensively relying upon RI MAC protocols which have
been introduced in Section 3.4 and further discussed in Chapter 4.
Before doing so, we want to point out that the scheme itself is independent of
the specific class of protocol used and can be adapted to work also with sender-
initiated MAC protocols. However, given the nature and the specific mechanics of
RI protocols, improvements in terms of delay and number of exchanged messages
can be achieved. For the design of our scheme we are going to base ourselves upon
ODMAC [24], which features a set of interesting capabilities, and is specifically
designed to be used with EH-WSNs.
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6.2.1 Scheme Description
The scheme we have devised is based upon the idea of adaptivity. The key fea-
ture it provides is to allow each node of the network to independently choose the
best compromise between security and energy consumption according to differ-
ent metrics.
A WSN is characterized by nodes producing and exchanging packets. Upon
creation, each packet pi is assigned a security value hpi := H(pi), where H : P !
E A is a function mapping elements from the set of possible packets P to tuples
representing security configurations. This function assesses the criticality of a spe-
cific packet. We will abstract from its implementation, but it could be thought as
a direct connection between specific parameters of a packet and importance val-
ues. For example packets representing aggregate values could be considered more
important than single measurements, or potentially harmful control packets (e.g.,
a message asking to reduce the transmission power) would be rated higher than
regular messages.
As described before, the h values are tuples (e; a) 2 E A where each compo-
nent directly translates into a specific security configuration of encryption and au-
thorization respectively. Different values are mapped to different algorithms and
parameters. This mapping can be decided at design-time of the specific network
application. An example can be seen in Table 6.1 where we describe only encryp-
tion modes assuming tuples of the form (e; 0). Another possible demonstration
can be the default security protocol list of 802:15:4 [36, Table 75], which com-
prises of encryption, authentication and authenticated encryption.
The protocol relies heavily on the RI paradigm, whenever a receiver node r trans-
mits a beacon, it will include its security capabilities ctr;max and ctr;min , these are re-
spectively the highest h tuple that r can satisfy and the lowest h tuple that r will
accept, at time t. A sender node s can then analyze beacons to check if both the
destination and the security capabilities of its owner are satisfactory. Assuming a
total ordering on the security capabilities, let~r be the final recipient for node s (e.g.,
the base station) and Δ(u, v) the function that measures the distance in number
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H(x) Encryption Authentication
(0; 0) No No
(1; 0) Skipjack No(Key size 80 bits, Block size 64 bits)
(2; 0) Hight No(Key size 128 bits, Block size 64 bits)
(3; 0) AES128 No(Key size 128 bits, Block size 128 bits)
Table 6.1: An example of the H-Security mapping.
of hops between two nodes u and v, then a beacon b from node r is considered
adequate for packet pi if and only if Δ(r;~r) < Δ(s;~r) ^ ctr;min  hpi  ctr;max
that is, if the distance between pi and its final destination ~r decreases by sending
pi to r, and r can satisfy the security requirements of pi. Note that we use a strict
inequality for the distance to account for ODMAC opportunistic forwarding (see
Section 4.1.1), where beacons moving a message closer to the final destination of
the packet are still considered adequate even if they could be sub-optimal from a
routing standpoint.
The pseudo-code for data transmission and reception can be seen in Algorithms 1
and 2. The focal point of these algorithms is the generation of the c values (lines 1.5,
1.6, 2.6 and 2.7). These values are tightly connected to the amount of energy avail-
able in a node and to the security policies of the system. The notion of available
energy is something constantly varying, especially in EH-WSNs. It may be the case
that a node has only enough energy to run in (No Security, No Security) mode at
the current time. However, that situation might improve after it has been able to
scavenge some more energy. On the other hand security policies can impose both
static and dynamic values according to the specific type of application. We will
now show through some examples how different scenarios can be accommodated
by adapting how security values are generated.
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Algorithm 1Adaptive security data transmission.
1: function send_data(data; dest)
2: Packet p
3: Beacon b
4: p:id self:id
5: p:e set_enc_capabilities()
6: p:a set_auth_capabilities()
7: p:data pack_data(data)
8: repeat
9: b wait_for_beacon()
10: until Δ(b:id; dest) < Δ(p:id; dest) AND
11: b:emin  p:e  b:emax AND
12: b:amin  p:a  b:amax
13: transmit(p; b:id)
14: end function
6.2.2 Static Mode
The first scenario that we will describe is defined as static mode and can be used
to help understand how our scheme works at its core. Senders generate c values
for outgoing packets according to the amount of energy available to the node at
time of creation, using a lookup-table to match security configurations and energy
requirements. A simple definition of this routine can be seen in Algorithm 3, note
that here the sender is not taking into account the criticality of the data to choose
the security configuration, but rather is using a “best effort” kind of strategy. At the
same time, the receiving side of each node is statically assigned security ranges. As
a result the system can be seen as a weighted directed graph where an edge from
u to v of cost c means that u can communicate to v (is physically in range), but
only provided that it uses the security features represented by c. The way to obtain
this behavior is to set cmin and cmax to the same value. By doing this a receiver can
decide the security class of the packets to accept.
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Algorithm 2Adaptive security data reception.
1: function receive_data()
2: Packet p
3: Beacon b
4: b:id self:id
5: repeat
6: (b:emin ; b:emax ) set_enc_capabilities()
7: (b:amin ; b:amax ) set_auth_capabilities()
8: transmit(b)
9: p wait_for_packet()
10: until p 6= nil
11: data unpack_data(p.data)
12: return data
13: end function
Algorithm 3 Encryption capabilities generation in static mode.
1: function set_enc_capabilities()
2: E get_current_energy()
3: return encryption_scheme[E]
4: end function
6.2.3 Dynamic Mode
The static mode is good for describing how the model works, however its utility is
limited. An extension is presented in the dynamic mode. WSNs often cover large
geographical areas such as forests or fields. It could be the case that treating the
whole area as a single zone with some fixed properties is not the best approxima-
tion. Imagine an example where a network is deployed in an area covering two dif-
ferent buildings connected by an open space. It is sensible to believe that the nodes
inside the buildings will be susceptible to fewer risks compared to the nodes out
in the open. For this reason, in dynamic mode, we allow the node at each hop to
reconfigure the h value of a packet, increasing it when moving towards a less secure
zone, or decreasing it when moving away from such a zone. Here the sender has
also to address the importance of the packet as part of the process, making sure
that important packets are not under-protected which would result in a security
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issue, or that less important packets are not over-protected leading to a waste of
energy. Similarly to senders, receivers can adapt their advertised c values depend-
ing on the specific area they are in, and the amount of energy currently available.
The pseudo-code for the c values generation in this case can be seen in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Encryption capabilities generation in dynamic mode.
1: function set_enc_capabilities()
2: E get_current_energy()
3: Z get_zone_id()
4: c encryption_scheme[E]
5: if is_low_security(Z) then
6: c c+ x
7: end if
8: return c
9: end function
As a result, a more fine-grained approximation of the area can be achieved, al-
lowing a more aware use of the available energy.
6.2.4 Path Mode
A third way for tailoring our scheme to a specific application is by using pathmode.
Here the idea is to force packets through specific paths by carefully choosing the
cmin values advertised by the receivers. Assuming that multiple paths are available
to one destination, and that the h value of a packet is related only to its importance,
a receiver can dynamically choose to accept different types of packet by adjusting
the value of cmin . For example imagine that we would like the network in Figure 6.1
to route all the packets containing aggregate measurements through nodes a, b and
c, whereas we do not care where single measurements packets are routed. This can
be achieved by setting cmin to (3; 3) in a, b, c, and to (1; 1) in the remaining nodes.
We also have to make sure that aggregate packets are assigned h values of at least
(3; 3) and they will be picked up only by nodes a, b and c as wanted.
Furthermore, the values advertised by receivers can be again dynamically varied
according to the situation of the network. For example if nodes a, b and c become
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Figure 6.1: Example of how routing can be affected in path mode. The high
security packets will be sent through nodes a, b and c, while the low security
ones will travel through e and f.
unavailable for a period of time, other nodes can take over their duties by increasing
their own cmin to accept aggregated packets. Another possibility is to dynamically
react to a localized attack (e.g., jamming) by redirecting traffic to a safe area of the
network.
6.2.5 Additional Modes
The modes provided above are not “features”, but rather they are meant to be con-
venient names to portray examples and guidelines on how the scheme itself can be
adapted to different scenarios and application requirements, and are by no means
meant to be exhaustive. Having the possibility to modify the behavior of both
senders and receivers allows for considerable flexibility, enabling the design of so-
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lutions that are tailored to the problem at hand and hence can guarantee good
performances. Imagine an application where delay is a main concern, i.e., pack-
ets should arrive from the nodes to the base station as quickly as possible. In this
scenario waiting for a beacon advertising the best energy to security ratio costs pre-
cious time. It is instead possible to have nodes try to send packets using the first
useful beacon, regardless of its security parameters.
At the other side of the spectrum we could have an application where security
is the main focus. Here each node could keep track of the security configuration
advertised through different beacons, and only use the best seen so far to relay
messages, possibly using a weight function that provides diminishing returns ac-
cording to how old a packet is.
What we have before defined as modes is nothing more than a set a parameters
and rules applied to the system and derived by the specific constraints of the appli-
cation. We feel that it is nigh on impossible to talk about adaptivity and optimiza-
tion without having a cost function (the specifications of the application) guiding
the optimization process. For this reason providing a model that is flexible enough
to adapt to different requirements is key in order to obtain good performances.
6.3 Discussion andConsiderations
In this section we will provide some points of discussion and some consideration
on the scheme in general, including how it would be possible to obtain the differ-
ent information required by the protocol and some considerations on the security
guarantees of our scheme.
6.3.1 Energy Management
Each node has to be aware of the current state of charge (SOC) of its main bat-
tery to decide which security values to advertise through beacons. This can be
realized with different methods, the most common being Voltage Based Estima-
tion and Coulomb Counting. In the first method it is possible to directly measure
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the voltage across the battery and relate this to the actual SOC by means of the dis-
charge characteristics relative to the specific chemistry process used within the cell.
For this method to achieve reasonable accuracy, compensation factors for tem-
perature, cell age and discharge rate should be factored in, making it slightly less
practical for WSNs. With Coulomb Counting the idea is to consider the battery
as a closed system containing a given amount of charge, when full, and subtract-
ing from this value as the battery depletes. In order to measure the actual current
drawn from the battery different sensing techniques such as shunt resistors or hall
effect sensors can be used.
To correctly asses the cost of a specific configuration it is required to measure
the amount of energy needed in order to use it. This can be done empirically, by
measuring the state of charge of the battery before and after a large enough number
of transmissions and then computing the average in offline experiments.
Once these quantities are known, it is possible for a node to correctly advertise
the currently supported configurations. As the state of charge varies over time, less
or more configurations will become available and the newly created beacons will
reflect the situation adaptively changing the supported features. This is where RI
protocols shine, thanks to their core mechanic it is extremely easy to convey in-
formation from the sender to the receiver before the actual packet is sent, without
having to perform unnecessary communications. The sender can then use these
information to decide whether or not the receiver is appropriate.
6.3.2 Security Considerations
Possible attacks to this protocol are closely related to the underlying MAC proto-
col and the encryption algorithms used. Without touching on the security of the
individual algorithms, which is out of the scope of this work, we now analyze what
a potential adversary might be able to achieve by manipulating messages within
the network and taking advantage of the protocol inner workings. This analysis
ties into the correct design of the system and can help define security properties
according to the required features. For the adversary model in this section we will
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consider a Dolev-Yao attacker [21] which is aware of the protocol and able to eaves-
drop, intercept and create new messages using the knowledge accumulated over
time.
A first concern is about forging beacons. This would allow the adversary to ad-
vertise incorrect security capabilities or malicious routing information in the form
or wrong identities. This problem is avoided by ensuring that either an encryp-
tion or an authentication layer is always present. The attacker would have to share
a key with other nodes in order to be able to communicate fresh messages with
them. This argument relies on the secrecy and the strength of the key, which is in
line with the attacker model. If for example poor key exchange mechanisms are
used within the application and the adversary can get hold of the key, the security
of the scheme is obviously defeated.
It is worth to point out that while using either authentication or encryption
provides the same upshot (packets can not be forged), the way this is obtained
is slightly different. In case of encryption we can say that in order to create a coun-
terfeit beacon, the adversary should produce a key that would allow him to create
packets that would be correctly and meaningfully decrypted by recipients nodes,
in other words he would have to have a shared key with all the target nodes. The
number of such keys depends on the keying scheme used: single-key, probabilistic,
group-based or pair-wise, just to name a few.
On the other hand, in the authentication case, the adversary would have to pro-
duce a key that can validate the content of the message against a tag appended at
end of the message itself, proving that the identity of the owner of the message is
legitimate. This is a separate key that can be managed in a completely different way
from the other one, for example it could be be a single key which, once compro-
mised, gives the possibility to exchange authentic messages with every other node
within the network.
Furthermore, if the system allows nodes to dynamically join the network, it be-
comes much harder to discover an attacker that tries to disguise himself as a regu-
lar node, complies to the protocol long enough to establish a genuine identity and
then goes rogue. The result of this is that while both systems guarantee the fresh-
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ness of a message, the decision of which is better suited to deal with the problem,
as often happens, lies in the details like the key management scheme used.
A second possible course of action for the adversary is to try and spoof or mod-
ify received beacons in order to re-transmit them at a later time. This is avoided by
using authentication schemes which, by definition, prevent messages to be modi-
fied. In other words, by using security suites like our scheme presented in Chap-
ter 4 both integrity and confidentiality are achieved.
Being this and adaptive scheme based upon EH, energy exploitation must be
carefully taken into account. While an attacker with physical access to the node
could in theory prevent it from recharging and keeping it in a low security state,
we believe this is not an effective attack. First of all if an attacker has physical ac-
cess to a node, energy exploitation is not the main concern, but rather the node
could be cloned, reprogrammed or have secret keys extracted from it, all kind of
attacks that would cause much greater harm to the whole network. Secondly if the
attacker wants to have some kind of distributed effect on the network by changing
the current energy parameters, he must do so for a considerable number of nodes,
and depending on the actual network size and the kind of energy used to power
the nodes, this could be unfeasible.
Finally, one more concern is about replayed beacons. As we have discussed pre-
viously, this technique can be used to impersonate another entity, carrying out
communications on her behalf and trying to gain some advantage from it. De-
pending on how this is done, it is possible to force senders to use lower than neces-
sary security settings in order to obtain cryptographic advantage, or to force higher
than necessary security settings, thus making nodes use more energy for each mes-
sage exchange and shortening their active time, possibly causing a denial of service.
Other ways of performing this kind of attack are similar in principle but a bit more
subtle, for example an adversary could monitor the traffic looking for nodes impor-
tant to the specific application, like nodes forwarding traffic in a high security path,
nodes with a high incoming degree (topology bottlenecks) or nodes performing
critical measurements. Once such potential targets have been identified, the at-
tacker can then use a series of replayed messages in order to selectively disrupt the
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victims. A solution to this issue can be found in RAP [20], the scheme introduced
in Chapter 5 which specifically targets the beacon replay attack. RAP can be used
on top of any security mode and can be factored in into the design of the system.
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It used to be expensive to make things public and cheap to
make them private. Now it’s expensive to make things private
and cheap to make them public.
Clay Shirky
7
KeyManagement
Key management is an integral part of security. Confidentiality and authenti-cation strongly rely upon good cryptographic algorithm to encrypt data and
compute CMACs. The encryption algorithms themselves require a sound design
and a strong key to work properly. All of the protocols and solutions discussed so
far make use of these techniques and therefore require good keys. Assuming that
the soundness of communication protocols and encryption algorithms holds, we
will now focus on how to securely generate and distribute keys in regular and EH
WSNs.
Generally, with the term key management we identify a series of processes and
techniques connected with handling cryptographic keys. Key generation is the
first step. In order to securely communicate, two entities (node-node or node-
sink) require a so called shared key. These keys should be generated in a way that
only the intended recipients have access to them. Furthermore, depending on the
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protocol in use, having a single shared key may not be enough. As we discussed
before, if a security scheme like the one developed for ODMAC provides both
confidentiality and authenticity through a single encryption algorithm, different
keys should be used for each purpose. This can be achieved in different ways, by
generating and sharing additional keys, or by deriving sub-keys from a master key.
If it is allowed for nodes to dynamically join and part the network, these proce-
dures should be repeated to accommodate for the new users. Moreover, if forward
and backward security are required, re-keying techniques are needed in order to
prevent old nodes to access new messages and new nodes to decrypt previously
recorded packets. In addition to this, cryptographic keys have a fixed lifespan,
they should not be used to encrypt or authenticate more then a given number of
messages. This is usually not a limitation of the key itself, but rather is due to the
fact that, depending on the specific scheme, encrypting the same values more than
once with the same key could potentially leak unwanted information. In order to
prevent this and make each packet unique, additional values are added. However,
these values have a fixed length and even by using all the possible combinations
there are only so many of them. When the combinations are exhausted, values
will repeat. To avoid that, keys should be renewed. Last but not least, if attacks
are detected or nodes are compromised, new keys should be distributed once the
attack has been dealt with.
7.1 Basic Schemes
We will now discuss some of the typical keying schemes and highlight which are
their key advantages and disadvantages.
7.1.1 Single Key
The most simple approach that can be adopted is to use a single key for the system.
This has numerous advantages in terms of ease of use. First of all it is possible to
hard-code the key inside a node at the time of creation. Thanks to this each node
has the possibility to interact with every other node of the network without having
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to carry out any procedure. This scheme requires an almost negligible amount of
memory since only a single value must be stored. Furthermore, it is possible for
new nodes to join at any time and start communicating with preexisting ones.
Despite that, the single key scheme falls short in terms of security guarantees.
First and foremost it provides a single point of failure. Whenever a node is com-
promised so is the security of the entire system. With a minimal effort, an attacker
is able to effectively become a fully fledged member of the network, able to send
authenticated messages, receive messages addressed to other nodes and decrypt
all past and future messages.
As a result this scheme is usually only used for demonstration purposes in se-
curity protocols due to its ease of implementation, but is should never be used in
real deployment.
7.1.2 Pairwise keys
The opposite approach to the single key is to use a different key for each pair of
nodes plus the sink. From a security standpoint this scheme offers the best pos-
sible security. If an attacker is able to compromise a node and obtain all its keys,
only the communications which directly involve this node are compromised. Any
other message is secured using a different key to which the attacker has no access.
Additionally, it is easy to recover from the loss of a single node, all that is required is
to distribute the identity of such node so that every other member of the network
can invalidate the specific key used to communicate with it.
Unfortunately, this scheme is extremely costly and it does not meet the scala-
bility requirements of a typical WSN. Given a network with n nodes, the number
of necessary keys for the whole system is n(n  1)=2. Considering that each node
has to maintain a number of keys that increases linearly with the number of nodes
(n   1) and that the overall number of keys is quadratic in the number of nodes,
this translates to a unsustainable memory consumption for an average node. As-
suming a node with 32 KiB of available memory and a cryptographic key of 128
b, the whole memory would be completely filled with keys after only 23 nodes. In
97
7. KEY MANAGEMENT
addition to that, for each node added to the network new keys must be generated
and distributed.
7.1.3 Random Pre-distribution
Besides being unsustainable from a memory point of view, the pairwise scheme
is also an overkill. Assuming that we want to achieve link based security, a mes-
sage is encrypted/authenticated and sent to the next hop where it is decrypted
and checked. The procedure is then repeated for each hop until the final destina-
tion is reached. This implies that not every pair of nodes has to share a key, but that
one is needed only for links through where messages are actually being transmit-
ted. The idea presented in [23] takes this into account and proposes a randomized
scheme where a pre-distribution phase assigns a small set of keys to each node in
a way that, with high probability, two nodes connected by a link will share a key.
Furthermore, a key generation procedure is used to obtain a key for links that do
not have one.
In the pre-distribution phase a large number of keys P (approximately 217 – 220)
is generated, each node then draws k values from P and uses them as its key-ring.
Trusted controller nodes are then used to store a mapping between the identity of
a node and the identifier of the keys in its key-ring. Finally each controller node is
given the keys shared with each node.
Successfully the shared-key discovery phase takes place. Here each node discov-
ers which key, if any, it shares with its neighbors. This is done by having each node
broadcast the identity of the keys in the key-ring or through a challenge-response
scheme, depending on whether or not the discovery phase should be public or
private. Each pair of nodes that are physically in range one another and share a
common key define a link.
The third phase called path-key establishment allows nodes physically in range
but not sharing a key to obtain one. To do that, pre-existing keys left unused after
the shared-key discovery are transmitted to the nodes participating in the path-key
establishment.
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Once the three phases are terminated each node in range shares a pair-wise key
with its neighbors.
The main property of this random scheme is that the probability that the con-
nectivity graph induced by the network is connected can be made arbitrarily large.
The authors use a formula derived by Erdős and Réni [22] in the study of random
graphs to show how this can be achieved. Let Pc be the desired probability of the
connectivity graph being connected and p the probability that there exists a link
between two nodes. Then, given a number n of nodes, G(n; p) is a random graph
whose probability of being connected is
Pc = lim
n!1
Pr [G(n; p) is connected] = ee c (7.1)
p = ln (n)
n
+
c
n
where c is any real constant: (7.2)
This allows to compute the degree of a node as d = p(n   1) which is the
required number of neighbors needed by a node. Furthermore, it is possible to
impose connectivity constraints upon the network (required number of neighbors
with a shared key) and the key-ring size, and consequently derive the size of the key
pool P given a desired probability p0 that two nodes share a key. This is obtained
from Equation (7.3)
p0 = 1 
 
1  kP
2(P k+1=2) 
1  2kP
(P 2k+1=2) : (7.3)
We omit the details of how this is derived and redirect the interested reader to
the original paper [23]. Instead we present a short numeric example to help clari-
fying the concept.
Assume a network with n = 10; 000 nodes and a desired connectivity prob-
ability PC = 0:99999. By inverting Equation (7.1) we obtain c = 11:51 and
Equation (7.2) yields p = 0:002. From this we can compute the required degree
d = 20:71. Hence, if each node has on average d neighbors the network is con-
nected with probability Pc. Furthermore, if we fix the key-ring size to k = 80 and
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a probability p0 = 0:5, we can derive the size of the pool from Equation (7.3) to
be P  10; 000.
Finally, the increase of the key-ring size is sub-linear in the size of the key pool.
For example if we increase P by a factor of ten, thus making it P = 100; 000, we
have an increase of k of a factor of 3:3 yielding a value of k = 260.
7.2 Multipath Key Reinforcement
The scheme described in the previous section is sound and tackles the problem of
distributing shared keys within a WSN. However, the keys used therein are sim-
ply the keys obtained after the shared-key discovery or the path-key establishment
phases. Anyway, all the keys are drawn from a fixed pool and, in order to achieve
greater probability of two nodes to share a key while maintaining the size of the
key-ring manageable for the memory size of a node, the pool should be kept as
small as possible. In contrast, with a small pool there is the concrete possibility
that the same key is used on more than one link, therefore if an attacker compro-
mises a node not only all the links that directly involve the node will be compro-
mised, but also any other link that uses one of the keys found in that node. To
address this, Chan et al. [9] present a multipath reinforcement scheme whose goal
is to strengthen the security by allowing each pair of nodes to use a unique ran-
dom key. This task can not be solved trivially by generating a sub-key from the
already shared key because an attacker that has been recording the key setup mes-
sages prior to capturing a node could now decrypt those messages and obtain the
new key and therefore access all the messages encrypted with it.
The proposed scheme takes advantage of disjoint paths. Assuming that two
nodes u and vwant generate a new key from the existing key kshared, then u chooses
j different disjoint paths connecting u to v that were setup during the key distri-
bution phase. For each one of these j paths, u, generates a random value x with
the same length of the key and sends them to v through the different j paths. After
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receiving j many values, u computes the new key kreinforced as
kreinforced = kshared  x1  x2      xj: (7.4)
In order to compromise kreinforced, an adversary has to compromise at least one
link on all of the j paths. While increasing the number j of paths used decreases
the probability of the attacker to succeed, the non immediate trade-off is that the
longer the path, the higher the probability of an attacker to compromise at least
one link. Moreover, computing the disjoint paths is computationally intensive.
To solve this, the scheme uses paths of two hops (three nodes), this makes the dis-
covery procedure less intensive and ensures that they are disjoint by construction.
A quick way to find such paths is for u and v to exchange their neighbors table and
identify the nodes in common.
Assuming ideal communications, i.e., circular communication range with ra-
dius r for both transmission and reception, two nodes separated by a given dis-
tance have an expected area of overlap is 0:5865πr2. Hence, the expected number
of reinforcing neighbors (the neighbors common to two nodes trying to run the
reinforcement scheme) is given by 0:5865p2n0, where p is the probability of two
nodes to share a key and n0 is the number of neighbors of a node. This can also be
expressed in terms of the degree of a node as 0:5865 d2=n0.
We now derive the increase of security achieved by the scheme. Let t be the
number of links used to reinforce the key and qlink the probability that an adver-
sary will compromise a single node. Then the probability that the adversary will
compromise the new key is equal to the probability of compromising either one
of the hops in the path, minus the probability of compromising both. By applying
this to all the t neighbors and including the original link we have
qreinforced = qlink(2qlink   q2link)t: (7.5)
The average overhead of the protocol can be approximated to 10, while the ef-
fort required by the attacker to break a reinforced link for a probability qlink = 0:1
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translates to an increase of 146 times. The scheme experiences diminishing re-
turns, the higher the probability of a node to be compromised, the lower the effort
required by the adversary.
7.3 AdaptiveMultipath Key Reinforcement
We now take a closer look at how the multipath reinforcement scheme can be ap-
plied to EH-WSNs. While the scheme can be run unmodified in this kind of sensor
networks it will not take advantage of the core properties of EH. To address that
we present a new adaptive scheme that takes into account the available energy of
the reinforcement neighbors.
As we have reiterated time and again, contrary to WSNs where the target is to
maximize the lifespan of the networks, one of the main goals of EH-WSNs is sus-
tainability, reaching the ENO state. In our scheme this can be achieved by balanc-
ing the number of reinforcement links used by the two nodes willing to establish a
new key, and the availability of reinforcement neighbors. Both parameters can be
adaptively chosen according to the amount of energy available to each node.
Depending on the particular network and to some extent also on the nature of
the energy being harvested, different energy situation are likely to be present. We
will now describe how the protocol adapts.
7.3.1 Scheme Description
Let us assume that nodes u and vwant to run the reinforcement scheme in order to
obtain a new key. We define su as the required number of reinforcing neighbors for
nodeu andku;v as the maximum number of neighbors connecting bothu and v, that
is the size of the intersection of the key-ring of u and v. The value su can be chosen
in different ways, for example on a message-per-message basis according to the
content of the packet or as a global parameter depending on the size of the network
and the required maximum probability that an adversary will compromise a link.
If su > ku;v then there are not enough available neighbors to run the protocol.
One option in this case is to wait for enough nodes to come online. However, given
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the unpredictability of EH-WSNs this may never realize, and by the time that new
nodes have become available, older ones might have run out of power. In this case
if a key must be established in a short period of time we fall back to a centralized
scheme where both u and v are assisted by the sink node. This protocol in inspired
by the well-known Needham-Schroeder protocol [62] and by [86] where the sink
plays the role of the trusted third party. Each node is equipped with a unique key,
shared with the BS. The protocol will start with u communicating its intention to
establish a key with v to the sink node. The sink will generate a new key eu;v for u
and v and a token tu. These values together with the nodes identities are sent to
both u and v, each encrypted with their own BS shared key. After that u will send
the token and its own identity to v, encrypting them with eu;v. The node vwill then
decrypt this value and compare the identity of u with the one received from the
sink. If the two match, v will encrypt the token under eu;v and send it back to u,
thus completing the protocol.
This protocol shifts most of the computational burden towards the BS, how-
ever it still requires a significant number of messages to be completed and, most
importantly, it is not distributed. Each node relies on the BS and a considerable
amount of energy will be spent by the nodes close to it since they will be involved
in the majority of the traffic. For this reason we select this protocol only when not
enough neighbors are available.
In the opposite case su < ku;v then the protocol can be run if the reinforcing
neighbors have enough energy available to participate. This value can be adver-
tised by the nodes themselves. An ideal way to do so is by including this informa-
tion together with the amount of energy available to the node as part of a beacon in
an RI protocol. In this way u will receive regular updates with a minimal overhead.
When enough neighbors are available u can greedly choose the du ones with the
highest amount of energy and start the protocol with them.
A node will choose autonomously whether or not it is able to participate to a run
of the protocol and advertise that to its neighborhood. One way to achieve that is
by setting a threshold on the energy reservoir above which a node is considered to
have stored enough energy to participate. The disadvantage of this approach is that
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if a node is hovering around the threshold value it might be asked to take place in
a run only to find itself without enough energy when the actual ensuing transmis-
sion should be performed. To avoid that we define a threshold window (tlow; thigh)
effectively setting up a comparator with hysteresis. Whenever the energy available
to a node is less than tlow the node will not participate in the protocol, whereas if
the value is above thigh the node will consider itself able to participate. If the cur-
rent available energy falls within the range (tlow; thigh) the node will maintain its
previous status until one of the other conditions is met. This provides a config-
urable energy buffer that can be varied according to many parameters such as the
typical load of the node, the size of the energy reservoir, the length of a packet,
etc. The window can be controlled by varying three parameters. The value of thigh
will determine how quickly the node will start participating, that is the amount
of energy required in order to be considered eligible for the protocol. The value
of tlow will determine how aggressively the node will participate or how quickly it
will transition from the eligible to the ineligible state. The difference thigh   tlow
will determine the size of the buffer or how resilient the node is to change its status
after a change in its available energy.
7.3.2 Evaluation
In order to evaluate different approaches we have run a series of simulations with
different parameters. Three arrangements of thresholds have been used, in each
of them the threshold is expressed as a portion of a unity energy reservoir. The
first arrangement of thresholds is t1 = (0:8; 0:9), here the window is small in size
and located towards the maximum value. This produces a very conservative be-
havior where in order to become eligible, a node has to be almost fully charged.
The second arrangement is t2 = (0:1; 0:2) in which the window has the same
size but its position is significantly lower. In this case a small amount of energy
is required for the node to participate in the scheme and it will keep participating
until its reservoir is almost completely depleted. The third arrangement is defined
as t3 = (0:15; 0:85) where the two threshold are set at the midway point of the
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previous arrangements, thus making the window size considerably wider. As a re-
sult this will provide a more stable behavior where the node will maintain its status
for longer and transition from one mode to the other when is either considerably
charged or almost out of power.
We evaluated these thresholds in three different network scenarios where we
vary s and k. The values we have used are respectively (2; 3), (2; 4) and (3; 4).
The simulation continuously runs the reinforcement scheme as the only main task
within a node. We let the simulation run for an allotted amount of time while ran-
domly changing the amount of energy harvested by each reinforcing neighbor and
keeping track of how many times the protocol was successfully run.
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Figure 7.1: Multipath reinforcement for EH-WSNs. Here the thresholds for
the hysteresis cycle are statically defined.
As it is possible to see in Figure 7.1, the common trend is that the second config-
uration, which was the most permissive one, always achieves the highest number
of runs, whereas configuration number one, being the most conservative, achieves
the lowest amount of protocol executions. Finally, the third configuration presents
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a good compromise on the number of runs by keeping the node active most of the
time while not letting it run as low in power as the first scheme. This was the ex-
pected behavior
The three configurations are a good display of how different parameters can be
accommodated by the system. Depending on what is the desired energy status of
the nodes, the thresholds can be set accordingly. If the network prioritizes secu-
rity and therefore wants the scheme to be able to run whenever is required, without
worrying of the fact that this could cause some of the nodes involved in the pro-
tocol to consume all of their stored energy, then a configuration similar to the first
arrangement can be used. On the other hand if we would like a network where en-
ergy should be mainly used to exchange messages and perform other tasks, while
the key reinforcement should be run only when there is some disposable energy,
then the second configuration is the most suited. The third configuration is a high
resiliency one and can be used for example when there are relatively short and fre-
quent fluctuation in the availability of the scavenged energy source. If the main
energy source were to disappear for a long enough period of time, the first con-
figuration would prevent a node to partake in the protocol almost immediately (as
soon as the stored energy started decreasing). The second configuration would in-
stead allow the node to almost run out of energy while still running the protocol.
If the third configuration was used in a scenario like this, the node would instead
join the protocol only when almost fully charged and therefore be able to sustain a
considerable number of executions, but it would not stop right away or exhaust its
energy storage when energy becomes unavailable. Once the main source would
reestablish itself, the node would simply start charging again without having mod-
ified its behavior in the meanwhile.
7.3.3 Sliding Window
One last configuration that we take into consideration is designed to increase adapt-
ability and better suit EH-WSNs. Here we use a sliding threshold window that
adapts to the current harvesting rate of a sensor. The window is allowed to shift up
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and down, and to shrink or expand depending on the current harvesting rate. The
idea in general is to start in a configuration similar to the first scenario presented
before with a small window positioned at the top. As we know this is a conser-
vative approach and is a good starting point for when the node first comes online
and has not much energy available. As the harvesting rate and the available en-
ergy increase, the window will start moving down and increase in size, reaching a
configuration that is halfway between arrangements number two and three. If the
harvesting rate becomes negative, the window will revert to its previous state by
floating back up and reducing its size.
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Figure 7.2: Multipath reinforcement for EH-WSNs. Both thresholds for the
participation of a node move according to the amount of energy available,
making a node more likely to participate if it has abundant energy.
As shown in Figure 7.2 the adaptive configuration performs similarly to the sec-
ond configurations, however, it will prevent a node to run too low on energy by
increasing the minimum threshold when there is not enough energy. Another ad-
vantage of this approach is that the nodes that are harvesting more energy will be
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the ones that will take part in the protocol more often. Furthermore, this concept
remains true in an adaptive way, meaning that if the energy source will change in
such a way that some nodes will not harvest as much energy, but others will start
harvesting more, then the second group will take over the duties of the first one.
As with the other scheme, the initial level of the thresholds and the expansion-
contraction rate are system parameters that can be tuned according to the applica-
tion and the energy source in use.
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It’s alive! It’s alive!
Henry Frankenstein (Colin Clive)
8
Implementation
In this chapter we will put together some of the different pieces introduced in theprevious chapters and we will present and discuss the implementation work
done on ODMAC. We will describe the platform of reference and show some prac-
tical measurements.
8.1 HardwareOverview
The core functionalities of ODMAC have been implemented on real nodes. The
platform we have used it the eZ430-RF2500Wireless Development Tool produced
by Texas Instruments [40] which is a commercially available development plat-
form and supports C language.
The board features a Texas Instruments MSP430F2274ultra low-power MCU [37]
(Figure 8.1) capable of running at up to 16MHz. The controlling unit has a con-
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sumption of 270μA@1MHz; 2:2V and a standby consumption as low as 0:1μA.
It uses a 16-bit architecture and features two internal 16-bit timers, a 10-bit ADC,
32KiB of flash memory and1KiB of RAM. Packaged inside the ADC and powered
by a constant current source connected to the internal reference there is a positive
temperature coefficient temperature sensor which allows the MCU to access the
temperature of the die and, to some extent, approximate the external temperature.
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Figure 8.1: Block diagram of the MSP430 MCU [37].
Several operating modes are available for this chip, one active mode (AM) and
four low-power modes, each of them providing a different set of functionalities
and a smaller number of active peripherals as shown in Table 8.1. When in any of
these modes, the device can be awaken by an interrupt event, handle the associated
routine and return to the same power mode previously selected.
Three different clock signals are available, the main clock (MCLK) is used for
the system CPU, the sub-main clock (SMCLK) used by the peripheral modules
and the auxiliary clock (ACLK) provided for the user. Each clock can be driven by
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Mode Description Consumption (μA)@1 MHz, 3 V
Mode All clocks are active 300
LPM1 CPU disabled 55
LPM2 CPU and MCLK disabled 17
LPM3 CPU, MCLK, DCO disabled 0:9
LPM4 All clocks are disabled 0:1
Table 8.1: MSP430 low-power modes, each mode reduces the available pe-
ripherals and therefore also the energy consumption of the chip [38].
one of the possible sources that include a 32; 768MHz watch crystal, the digitally-
controlled oscillator (DCO) (1–16MHz) and the very-low-power low-frequency
oscillator (VLO) ( 12 kHz).
The various clock sources can be also used to drive the two timers (Timer A and
Timer B) to allow different timings of interrupt generation.
The board also features a CC2500Chipcon2:4GHz low-power RF transceiver [39]
(Figure 8.2). This has a programmable data rate from 1:2 to 500 kBd and typical
current consumption of 17:0mA for reception above sensitivity limit, 21:2mA for
transmission @0 dBm and 900 nA in power-down mode.
The advantage of this board is that it accepts different power adapters. A USB
dongle allows the node to connect to a computer and behave as a BS, while a bat-
tery adapter allows for cordless operation. Furthermore it is possible to connect
third-party power supplies to provide energy in different ways. Conveniently for
us Cymbet produces a series of compatible EH products including different eval-
uation kits of which we have used two in particular.
The first board is the CBC-EVAL-10 demonstration kit [13] (Figure 8.3) which
is an EH solution designed to connect to photovoltaic cells whereas the other
broad, called CBC-EVAL-09 [12] (Figure 8.4) accepts multiple types of energy
at its input.
As it is possible to see in the block diagram in Figure 8.5, the board accepts:
low voltage (below 4:06 V) DC input, low voltage (below 4:06 V) AC input, high
voltage (between 4:06 V and 20 V) DC input and high voltage (between 4:06 V
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Figure 8.2: Block diagram of the CC2500 RF transceiver [39].
and 20 V) AC input.
The input selection constitutes the main difference between the two boards.
Both of them are in fact equipped with the same EnerChip CBC51100 module
which comprises of two 50 μAh solid-state batteries for a total capacity of 100 μAh
and can optionally accommodate external rechargeable batteries.
8.2 Implementation ofODMAC
We have developed a proof of concept implementation of ODMAC, and we will
now discuss some of the details.
8.2.1 Core Functionality
One of the most important features to obtain was to allow the system to switch be-
tween active and sleeping states, in other words to implements DCs. As we have
introduced in Chapter 4, ODMAC has two different and independent DCs, one
is used for producing beacons and forwarding messages, while the other is used
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Figure 8.3: The CBC-EVAL10 board.
to fulfill the sensing tasks of the node. To produce the desired effect we have pro-
grammed nodes to continuously run in LPM (specifically LPM3), and awake them
by means of interrupts. The chosen LPM allows the ACLKs to remain active, this
clock signal is used to source Timer A, allowing it to trigger at regular intervals. In
order to implement the two DCs we have decided to use a fundamental time quan-
tum T and to derive the DCs as its multiples. This allows us to have independent
periods TB = tBT and TS = tST for beaconing and sensing respectively.
Every T cycles the main period interrupt is fired and, by keeping track of how
many periods have elapsed, the system reacts accordingly. After having performed
the required operations for the current period, if any, the node goes back into the
designated LPM and the procedure starts over. One additional factor is that the
duration of the quantum is not constant, instead at each iteration it is randomized
by a number of cycles in the range [ 2r 1; 2r 1]where r is a system parameter that,
in our implementation provides a variation of roughly 12 %. This is done to avoid
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Figure 8.4: The CBC-EVAL09 board.
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Figure 8.5: Block diagram of the CBC-EVAL09 board [12].
unfortunate synchronization situations where two (or more) neighboring nodes
would wake-up at the same time and remain synchronized until one of them would
run out of energy. This is an undesirable situation if they both want to receive
from or transmit to a third node. The pseudo-code of the main loop of ODMAC
is shown in Algorithm 5. There we can see the main system parameters described
above used to initialize the fundamental time quantum, the baconing period, the
sensing period and the randomization value.
The two main tasks carried out during the activity of the node are the funda-
mental routines send and receive. Within them, the RI paradigm is implemented.
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Algorithm 5Main loop of ODMAC.
1: function setup(t; tB; tS; r)
2: T t
3: TB  cB  tB
4: TS  cS  tS
5: R r
6: start_timer(t)
7: set_mode(LPM3)
8: end function
9:
10: function timer_interrupt
11: cB  cB   1
12: cS  cS   1
13: if cB = 0 then
14: receive()
15: cB  TB
16: end if
17: if cS = 0 then
18: send()
19: cS  TS
20: end if
21: T randomize(R)
22: start_timer(t)
23: set_mode(LPM3)
24: end function
The send routine (Algorithm 6) in this implementation is also an abstraction for
generating data. Overall the following operations are performed: first a packet is
formatted, this can happen in two different ways, the packet is generated locally
by accessing the on-board sensor and extracting the data, or the data comes from
a packet received from another node and must be forwarded. When the packet is
ready for transmission the node will turn on its radio and wait for an appropriate
beacon. When one is received the packet is transmitted and the node returns to a
sleeping state.
On the other hand, the receive routine (Algorithm 7), is dedicated to forward-
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ing messages coming from another node. When its handler is invoked, the node
will create and transmit a beacon containing the relevant information. The node
will then wait for messages for a given amount of time. If no message is received
the node will simply go back to its sleeping state. In case the beacon is instead an-
swered the received packets is processed and fed to the send routine which will
forward it to the next hop.
The packet format for regular unsecured packets can be seen in Figure 8.6.
Data Packet
0 2 3 4 8 16 24 87
T
y
p
e
E
n
c
A
u
t
h
Node ID Seq Num Data
0 2 3 4 8 16 23
T
y
p
e
E
n
c
A
u
t
h
Layer Beacon ID
Beacon Packet
Figure 8.6: Unsecured packet format for ODMAC. No authentication mecha-
nism is available and data is sent in the clear.
8.2.2 Security implementation
The security suite frameworks previously described in Chapter 4 have also been
implemented. This extra functionality requires some modification to the transmis-
sion routines, but it is generally transparent to the user which only has to set the
desired mode. When a packet is created and about to be sent, it is first encrypted (if
required) and then authenticated (again, if required). The well-known advantage
of applying those transformations in this order is that integrity of the cipher-text
is provided and, as a consequence, also integrity of the plain-text. Furthermore,
it is not possible to maliciously modify the cipher-text so that it will decrypt to
some other (meaningful) plain-text, and finally assuming that the output of the
encryption will appear to be random, so will the result of the CMAC, preventing
structural information to leak through.
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When a secured message is received the opposite procedure is performed. First
of all the CMAC is verified, if there is a mismatch the message will be discarded
and the node informed with a corresponding error. This prevents malformed mes-
sages to have an impact on the whole network by being forwarded to other nodes,
causing them to spend unnecessary energy in the process. Once the message is au-
thenticated it will be decrypted and the normal behavior of the node will continue.
The packet format for the highest security mode (authentication and encryption)
is shown in Figure 8.7.
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Figure 8.7: Fully secured packet format for ODMAC. An authentication code
is added at the end of both types of message, and the data field is also en-
crypted.
8.2.3 Routing Implementation
The distributed LARs scheme is also part of the implementation. The function
layer(u) is used to compute the distance between node u and the BS in number of
hops. The initial setup phase consists of setting the sink node with a layer value
of zero. Upon receiving beacons each node will compute its own layer as a plus
one increment to the minimum layer value received so far. After that, a beacon is
defined as appropriate, and can therefore be used to exchange a message, if and
only if its layer is less than the layer advertised within the beacon. Since nodes can
only decrease their layer value and never increase it, they would not react correctly
to the addition of new nodes. To avoid that, these values are reset after a fixed
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amount of time if no appropriate beacons have been received.
Algorithm 6Data transmission in ODMAC.
1: function send()
2: Packet p
3: Beacon b
4: p:id self:id
5: p:layer self:layer
6: if p:fwd_data = false then
7: p:data read_from_sensor()
8: p:fwd_data = true
9: end if
10: if p:enc = true then
11: p:data encrypt(p.data)
12: end if
13: if p:auth = true then
14: p authenticate(p)
15: end if
16: repeat
17: b wait_for_beacon()
18: until is_appropriate(b) = true OR timeout() = true
19: if timeout = false then
20: transmit(p)
21: end if
22: end function
8.2.4 Experimental Results
We have conducted some experiments with our proof of concept implementation
imagining different scenarios. We consider a delay-tolerant application focused to-
wards throughput, such as a long-term data monitoring for off-line analysis. Here
we assume that quickly receiving data packets is not crucial since the analysis will
be performed at a later time. What is important instead is the sheer number of
packets successfully received. The more the date, the better the analysis.
To experiment in this scenario we focus on a single link, hence we use two reg-
ular nodes: a sender and a receiver. The sender will wake up according to its DC,
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Algorithm 7Data reception in ODMAC.
1: function receive()
2: Packet p
3: Beacon b
4: b:id self:id
5: b:layer self:layer
6: repeat
7: transmit(b)
8: p wait_for_packet()
9: until p 6= nil OR timeout() = true
10: if timeout = true then
11: return timeout_err
12: end if
13: if p:auth = true then
14: if check_tag(p) = false then
15: return tag_err
16: end if
17: end if
18: if p:enc = true then
19: p:data decrypt(p.data)
20: end if
21: return p:data
22: end function
perform a reading from the sensor, encrypt and authenticate the packet and trans-
mit it to the receiver node by waiting for a beacon and then actually sending the
packet. In Figure 8.8 the current consumption of a node is shown, and it is possible
to see how each of the aforementioned phases are clearly reflected in the plot. The
majority of the current is used by the radio in listening mode while waiting for a
beacon. This was the expected behavior.
To test our system we have programmed two different kind of receivers node
with different DC values. An high DC receiver, which is set to approximately33ms
of sleeping time between two consecutive beacons, and a low DC receiver where
the same value is set to 66 ms. With this configuration we found that the average
activity duration for the transmitter node was μhigh = 43 ms with standard devia-
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Figure 8.8: Current consumption of a transmitter node during a typical ac-
tive period. The waveform was obtained by measuring the voltage across a
10 Ω shunt resistor in series with the power supply. It is possible to divide the
waveform into four different sections, each one corresponding to a specific
phase of the active period. Specifically, from left to right we have: sleep end,
packet generation, waiting for a beacon, packet transmission and sleep start.
tion of σhigh = 11 ms for the high DC receiver, and μlow = 61 ms with a standard
deviation of σ low = 23 ms for the low DC receiver.
We also consider an EH case. The receiver node in this experiment was powered
through one of the EH boards introduced before, specifically the CBC-EVAL-09.
The intended purpose of this board is to provide power to the node when it re-
quires it, mainly during MCU activity and data transmission. To do so, the en-
ergy stored within the two solid state batteries, which in turns are replenished by
a photovoltaic cell, is used to charge-up a 1000 μF output capacitor that will then
provide power to the node itself. While this technique works well for low and sus-
tained current requests, it does not support current spikes which would deplete
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the capacitor and shutdown the node. Furthermore, a safety mechanism kicks in
and the load is disconnected until the capacitor is fully charged. This is behav-
ior is independent of the SOC of the batteries which simply do not have enough
time to recharge the capacitor if this is overdrawn. As described in an application
note [11] the minimum time for the batteries to replenish the capacitor is 10 s.
We have empirically established that active periods of around 150 ms are tol-
erated by the system and do not cause a reset. To address the issue in a definitive
manner, instead of replacing the capacitor with a larger one, we decided to use a
feedback loop. We measured and conditioned the voltage across the output capac-
itor, and fed it back to the of the internal ADC of the MCU. By doing so the node is
aware of whether or not there is enough energy to perform a message exchange. As
a consequence of this, not all the active periods are used, but only the ones where
the capacitor is sufficiently charged. We have set the time quantum to one second
and the transmission multiplier tS = 10 in order to have an overall transmission
periodTS = 10 s. We consider a period usable whenever the nominal value across
the capacitor is above 3:3 V.
The result of this operation is to have a variable DC that automatically adapts to
the current amount of energy and to the harvesting rate. In Figure 8.9 it is possi-
ble to see the voltage across the capacitor and its peculiar charge/discharge cycle.
Different factors come into play here. The “depth” of the discharge is affected by
how long the radio is turned on, and by the current charge value, the recovery time
depends by the previous charge value (how much of the energy stored within the
capacitor was used) and the current harvesting rate. Finally the number of dis-
charges is associated with the usable active periods and depends an all this factors,
the less energy used in the previous period and the shorter the recovery time, the
more likely it is that the next period will be usable.
In order to try different harvesting rates we shone a controllable light source
towards the photovoltaic panel connected to the harvesting board. By varying the
distance we were able to vary the light intensity and therefore the harvesting rate of
the node. We then conducted subsequent experiments of 30 minutes each. Con-
sidering that the amount of energy inside the capacitor is sufficient for two to three
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Figure 8.9: Voltage across the output capacitor, each charge/discharge cy-
cle represents an active period. The likelihood of a period to be considered
usable depends on many factors such as the amount of energy left inside the
capacitor during the previous period and the harvesting rate.
packet exchanges in the best possible conditions, the continuous operation of the
node for the whole duration of the experiments confirms its sustainability.
Another interesting fact is that more energy available allows the system to recharge
more consistently and therefore more periods will be usable to perform message
exchanges. As a consequence of this, more packets will be sent and the through-
put will increase, as initially desired for this application. The ENO-Max state of the
system is given by the time quantum. Assuming that enough energy is available no
more than one packet per ten seconds (the active period frequency) can be sent.
Using the current consumption of a node and the voltage across the solar panel,
we estimated the power consumption of a node and plotted it against the achieved
throughput as shown in Figure 8.10. As it is possible to see the throughput is
proportionally dependent to the input power and furthermore in the high-DC re-
ceiver case, where a beacon is sent every 400 cycles, this values is also capped by
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the hard limit of 6:0 packet/min (1:0 packet/10 s).
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
High DC Receiver (400 Cycles)
Low DC Receiver (800 Cycles)
Power Input (µW)
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 (p
kt
 /
 m
in
)
Figure 8.10: Performance of different nodes at different power levels. When
the available power is more than the amount used by the normal operation of
a node, the throughput reaches the software limit.
A second scenario that we have devised focuses on a security-centric applica-
tion. We consider a situation where two kind of packets are available to a sender
node: low security and high security ones. Low security packets will be sent unen-
crypted, whereas high security ones must be encrypted and authenticated. When-
ever possible we give precedence to high security packets, meaning that if enough
energy is available an encrypted and authenticated message will be sent. An un-
secured message will be sent otherwise. We used the same configuration with a
single link used in the previous experiment and, for low security packets we kept
the same threshold voltage to determine whether or not an active period is usable.
However, we used a different threshold increased by 12:5%, to establish whether
a period was usable for high security packets.
The normal behavior of the sender node would then be the following: upon
waking up it would check the capacitor value, if the value is above the higher thresh-
old the node would send a high security packet, if the value is between the high and
the low threshold the node would send a low security packet and if the value is be-
low the low threshold the node would go back to sleep.
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We first run a control experiment only sending low security packets, thus dis-
abling the security overhead. Afterwards, we have run the full experiment with
both thresholds. Both experiments lasted for 90 minutes and are summarized in
Figure 8.11. In the control case we were able to send525packets, averaging0:097pack-
et/s (0:97packet/10 s). This value is very close to the theoretical limit of1:00packet/10 s.
For the full-blown experiment we managed to transmit 486 packets over the entire
duration, 397 of which were high security (encrypted and authenticated), while
the remaining 89 were low security. As a result we achieved a cumulative aver-
age of 0:090 packet/s (0:90 packet/10 s) and an average rate of 0:073 packet/s
(0:73 packet/10 s) for high security packets only.
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Figure 8.11: The adaptive, security-enabled scheme has tighter energy re-
quirements but shows a decrease in packets sent of only 7.42%.
Despite having added more functionalities and tightened the energy require-
ment by increasing the transmission threshold, we were able to maintain extremely
similar performance. This proves that the impact of the security suite is negligible.
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8.3 Test-bedDeployment
Finally, in order to provide a real environment, we have deployed a small temper-
ature monitoring network consisting of ten nodes, with one of them operating as
sink (Node 0) and the rest as sensor nodes. Node 1 is powered by the solar en-
ergy harvester board introduced before, while the other sensor nodes are powered
by batteries. The nodes are forming a multi-hop topology, and are positioned as
shown in Figure 8.12. The battery-powered nodes are generating one data packet
every 15 minutes and one beacon every 2 seconds. Node 1 reports once every 30
minutes and generates a beacon once every minute. Note that this configuration
is sustainable, i.e., the amount of power harvested (approximately 4:9 μW) allows
for a continuous operation. Authentication and encryption are activated for all
transmitted data packets. Additionally, all beacons are authenticated.
Due to the lack of acknowledgments and retransmissions, we experienced sig-
nificant packet loss for the nodes that were deployed far away from the sink, i.e.,
Nodes 4–9. In the case of the nodes deployed close to the sink, that is nodes 1–
3, approximately all the packets were received. Additionally, we observed that
Node 4 forwarded most of the traffic for Nodes 5–9. This phenomenon can be
explained by its physical position, which keeps the beacon and data packet error
rate significantly low.
It is important to mention that this particular setup was still in the early stages
of the development of the firmware and is presented mainly as a proof of concept
for a sustainable operation.
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Figure 8.12: The topology of the deployed test-bed resulting in a multi-hop
network.
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A conclusion is simply the placewhere you got tired of thinking.
Dan Chaon
9
Conclusion
This study set out to explore and better understand security in EH-WSNs. Se-curity is an all-important task in any branch of computer science; it has been
and it continues to be a hot research topic both in general and for WSNs in partic-
ular. EH on the other hand is a very new an promising scenario which has gained
more and more popularity over the past few years, especially after being applied to
the field of WSNs. This study sought to combine these two aspects by analyzing
how they can interact and take advantage of one another. We wanted to under-
stand how a non-monotonic change in energy could affect the security of a sensor
network and how the highly inconsistent and ever-changing energy configurations
of single nodes would influence the network as a whole.
To do this we started off by looking at the big picture, identifying and defining
attackers that are specific to this particular domain, through a formal approach. We
have described new possible actions that attackers can perform to take advantage
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of EH and its peculiar characteristics. To better understand this, we have orga-
nized different attackers in a taxonomy and composed a list of attacks matching
our taxonomy. One of the first results obtained from this was that the commonly
used Dolev-Yao attacker model is indeed an over-approximation of many aspects
of what an attacker can do in both a regular WSN and an EH-WSN, and yet this
model is not considering other aspects of the same scenarios. We therefore high-
lighted the need for a cyber-physical attacker which could better take into account
the unique challenges of sensor networks.
We then concentrated on securing EH-WSNs specifically focusing on one of
their building blocks, MAC protocols. They constitute the hart of most sensor
networks by controlling how and when the wireless channel is accessed and how
the radio is used. This is where most of the energy budget of a node is used, and
in our minds it had to be first point to tackle. During this process we discovered
how the RI paradigm was particularly well-suited for this application and there-
fore turned our attention towards them. This family of protocols use small packets
called beacons to manifest the intention of a node to receive data. This was a good
match for our needs, but we realized that none of the RI protocols already available
would allow EH-WSNs to achieve the best performance so we started designing
what would become ODMAC.
We introduced this protocol in Chapter 4. ODMAC is an RI protocol that is de-
signed to address the issues typical of EH-WSNs. Specifically, it allows each single
node of the network to independently select its own DC according to the current
amount of energy available. We set out to secure ODMAC and designed a small,
inexpensive and efficient protection mechanism that can provide both confiden-
tiality and integrity. By operating at the link layer it also allows to tackle security as
soon as possible making sure that malformed or maliciously forged packets are dis-
posed right away and their impact on the whole system is minimized. ODMAC has
also other components, one of the most interesting being opportunistic forward-
ing and its close sibling, LAR. Despite effectively being a networking functionality,
this can be efficiently implemented inside ODMAC, bringing the two layer closer
and starting to blur the dividing line between them. We noticed this being a recur-
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By analyzing ODMAC and RI protocols in general we realized that a very ef-
fective new attack was possible, the beacon replay attack. We described this new
attack in Chapter 5 and show how it can affect any kind of protocol relying on bea-
coning techniques. We also showed how preexisting techniques do not apply in
this case because of how EH-WSNs behave and function. To address this problem
we introduced a new challenge-response protocol called RAP that allows to estab-
lish the identity of a receiver. The protocol has two major modes, the detection
mode is meant for typical scenarios when the network is not trusted but there are
no specific reasons to consider it particularly insecure, and when the application
can tolerate it. In this mode the receiver authentication and the data transmission
happen simultaneously. As a result a data packet could be given away to an attacker
right before realizing his true identity. The advantage of this mode is its low energy
cost since it imposes a small overhead in terms of packet size, but no additional
message exchange are required. The prevention mode on the other hand is meant
to be used when the detection phase has proven the existence of an ongoing attack
or when the application requires considerable security. This mode decouples the
authentication and the data exchange phases, engaging in the latter only if the for-
mer completed successfully. The downside of this is that one extra message has to
be exchanged back and forth between the two nodes, thus increasing its cost. We
have also discussed about transition policies and when it is useful and appropriate
to switch from one mode to the other depending on external parameters imposed
by the application.
We then move into the world of adaptive security in Chapter 6. Here we explore
the possibility of changing security parameters according to the current amount of
energy in a node. Thanks to the EH capabilities the reservoir of a node could be
in completely different situations in two moments in time. We present a scheme
where each node decides and advertises the security capabilities that it can provide
and the requirements of the packets that it is willing to accept. Different security
capabilities correspond to different configurations of security parameters such as
encryption algorithm, key-length and block-size. We start discussing a static mode
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where each node has an immutable preassigned set of capabilities. We use this
mode as a tool to introduce the scheme itself and start discussing the dynamic
mode. Here nodes with different capabilities coexist for example by being orga-
nized into security zones, and the security requirements of a packet can be varied
from hop to hop depending on the type of zone that has to be traversed. Finally we
introduce the path mode which provides an example of how traffic can be differen-
tiated and sent across different paths according to its importance and its security
requirements. We also discuss how well-matched RI protocols are for setting up
this kind of infrastructure since the sender can decide a priori whether or not a
node can match both the routing and the security constraints of a packet. Finally
we argue that, just like we did for RAP, what we call mode is not an hard-coded
set of rules, but rather a particular configuration of the nodes that provides the re-
quired behavior. This highlights that an high degree of customization is left in the
protocol and that it can be tailored to fit and match the constraints dictated by the
specific application.
In Chapter 7 we analyzed key establishment and managements schemes. Many
aspects of security are often achieved through encryption which is a fundamental
tool that relies on secure and sound implementations, and strong keys. We dis-
cussed the most common approaches for how to manage multiple keys and why
these are needed. We then focused on a specific method called multi-path key rein-
forcement which takes one key shared between two nodes and aims at reinforcing
it by means of composition with additional keys from other nodes and through
disjoint paths. We designed and introduced a method that enables nodes of an
EH-WSN to select an appropriate number of participants in the protocol, depend-
ing on their available energy. We devised a threshold scheme that allows each node
to independently define the terms of its participation in the protocol. We also de-
scribed a fully adaptive scheme where the thresholds are dynamic and move ac-
cording to the current harvesting rate. This permits high-energy nodes to be avail-
able to join more frequently and for longer periods of time, while low-energy nodes
can avoid to be exploited. Thanks to the adaptivity, these changes take place with-
out having to set fixed limits that would be only as good as the approximation and
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understanding of the system when it is designed, but rather by reacting and adapt-
ing to different situations independent of why and how they come to be.
Finally in Chapter 8 we presented an implementation of some of our protocols
and schemes. To the best of our knowledge this is one of the first and very few
implementations specifically focused on EH-WSNs. We then conducted several
experiments that proved our theories and helped us building our confidence that
our intuition was correct. This also deepened our understanding of the topic and
reminded us how big the difference between theory and practice can be, and how
things that are given for granted in the theoretical work are a nightmare to recreate
in the real one.
9.1 FutureWork
We will now discuss some of the possible directions that can be taken to further ex-
pand this work. We feel that much more can be done to improve security in sensor
networks, and that taking advantage of EH capabilities can help reaching the goal
of achieving more robust and resilient systems. Starting from the security suite de-
veloped for ODMAC a further investigation of authenticated-encryption schemes
can be taken into account, especially given the latest developments of OCB be-
coming free to use. A more in-depth analysis could reveal how much energy is
necessary to achieve each different property and what can be saved by combining
them.
Additional implementation work is a major area to cover. Due to time con-
straints, protocols such as RAP and the adaptive schemes presented have been con-
ceptualized or evaluated through simulations, where a real implementation would
help to present more accurate results. Making use of other platforms for imple-
mentation is also a key improvement. Each different type of hardware has a dif-
ferent design and different constraints. Adapting our current design to run on a
different kind of nodes to see how the system behaves is a fascinating area to ex-
plore. Further experiments can also be done in conjunction with the harvesting
hardware, possibly by using solutions that provide a different approach.
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Ultimately a global approach can be taken. By designing and defining new dif-
ferent applications, with different requirements, it is possible to study each scheme
and see how its parameters can be adapted in order to increase its performance, but
also by looking at the system as a whole and making sure that the cooperation level
between the different components is optimal and that, where possible, one scheme
takes advantage of what another one has to offer.
9.2 Final Remark
To conclude, in this work we had an extensive look at security in EH-WSNs trying
to cover different aspects. At the same time we wanted to maintain an organized
and structured approach and, where possible, trying to take advantage from what
has already been done for regular WSNs and in security in general. We also kept
building new protocols and schemes by using our previous work as foundation,
making sure that different aspects could work together, and that key goals would
be preserved. Probably the most important conclusion at which we arrived is that
sensor networks are too specialized and constrained to heave a one-size-fits-all so-
lution. Each application is completely different from another one and so are the
requirements. What sounds impossible in one case, is routine in another one. For
this reason we strongly believe that two points are essential for developing good
sensor network protocols and applications. The first one is moving away from the
legacy layer-oriented approach towards an holistic approach. This allows the dif-
ferent components of each node to cooperate in harmony and take advantage not
only of the different service they provide, but also of their inner workings. We saw
this when we were able to include routing schemes both in ODMAC and in our
adaptive security scheme, or when we used beacons to convey information that did
not strictly concerned the MAC protocol, but that we could piggyback on them
since they had to be sent in any case. The second point is that trying to account for
all the possible application requirements and scenarios is hard, error-prone and
nigh on impossible. This is why protocols and schemes should not try to predict
and solve all the problems, but rather they should provide robust mechanics to ad-
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dress core and common issues that are typical of this field. It should be then left to
some wise man with good knowledge of the specific application to compose those
mechanics, optimize the configuration and tweak all the parameters while holding
the tongue at the right angle and stroking his long gray beard.
Finally, we believe that this particular field of study is extremely new and that
significant progress can still be made. We have the hope and the ambition that
this work can somehow help the research community to break new paths and con-
tribute to the overall development of this fascinating topic.
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